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DUE PROCESS AND FEDERAL GRANT
TERMINATION: CHALLENGING
AGENCY DISCRETION THROUGH
A REASONS
REQUIREMENT
ROBERT S. CATZ*
This spectacular expansion of both the size and scope of grant programs
engendered surprisingly little case law on the administration of federal
grants. However, there is no doubt that an ever increasing number of
cases in this area will be presented. . . . [Tihere currently is a need for a
fuller body of law concerning this slumbering giant.'
I. INTRODUCTION
These words have certainly proven to be prophetic. Growth in fed-
eral grant expenditures has been exponential.2 In 1950 federal expend-
itures for grant programs were only 2.2 billion dollars.3 Expenditures
for fiscal year 1981, according to current budgetary estimates, will
reach 96.3 billion dollars.' This figure, moreover, reflects federal grant
© Copyright 1981 by Robert S. Catz
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University. This
work was assisted by a faculty research grant from the Cleveland-Marshall Fund. The author
wishes to acknowledge the able assistance of David Goodwin and the valuable comments of his
colleagues Ralph S. Tyler and Susan R. Chalker.
1. Southern Mut. Help Ass'n v. Califano, 574 F.2d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (the author was
counsel for plaintiff).
2. Mason, Current Trends in Federal Grant Law--Fiscal Year 1976, 35 FED. B.J. 164 (1976).
3. Boasberg & Feldesman, The Washington Beat: Federal Grant Law and Administration, 7
URB. LAw. 556 (1975).
4. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, Special Analysis H.- Federal Aid to State and
1067
Washington University Open Scholarship
1068 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:1067
assistance5 to state and local governments only. It represents an in-
crease of 7.4 billion dollars over estimated expenditures for fiscal year
1980 and 13.5 billion dollars over fiscal year 1979 expenditures,6 and
these figures do not include the amount of local matching funds that
are required under most grant programs. The Office of Management
and Budget estimates these funds to be 25% of federal expenditures. 7
Federal grant expenditures have increased significantly, not only in
absolute dollar amounts, but in relative terms as well. From fiscal year
1958 to fiscal year 1978, grants to state and local governments grew at
an annual rate of 14.6%.8 These grants represented 5.3% of the total
budgetary outlays of the federal government in fiscal year 1950, peaked
at 17.3% of budgetary outlays in fiscal year 1978, and then slipped back
to an estimated 15.6% of budgetary outlays for fiscal year 1981. 9
Detailing the dimensions of grant assistance to state and local gov-
ernments by no means reveals the full extent of federal grant activities.
Not even all public sector grants are included in the 96.3 billion dollar
figure. A major example of such public sector grants is payments for
research and development conducted by public universities.' 0
Of far greater importance than grants for university research, how-
ever, is the grant assistance provided by the federal government to non-
government grant recipients. These recipients include hospitals, foun-
dations, community groups, profit and nonprofit organizations, and
even some individuals." Although the Office of Management and
Local Governments, in SPECIAL ANALYSIS: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, Fis-
CAL YEAR 1981, at 239 (1981) [hereinafter cited as SpecialAnalysis H].
5. The term federal grant applies to any disbursement of monies or property by the federal
government in support of programs that benefit the public and are carried out by the several
states, their political subdivisions, public and private subdivisions, public and private institutions,
and private individuals. See D. WRIGHT, FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID: PERSPECTIVES AND ALTER-
NATIVES 18 (1968).
6. Special Analysis H, supra note 4, at 239.
7. R. CAPPALLI, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER FEDERAL GRANTS 11 (1979).
8. SpecialAnalysis I, supra note 4, at 239.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 260. Payments for research and development at public universities are excluded
from the budget definition of grants because they are considered to have the character of govern-
ment procurements of services rather than the character of grant aid. Such payments are, how-
ever, included in the census series and national income and product accounts (NIA) series
definitions of grants. The federal government budgeted $4.6 billion for research and development
at all colleges and universities (including medical schools) for fiscal year 1981. OFFICE OF MAN-
AGEMENT AND BUDGET, Special Analiss K, in SPECIAL ANALYSIS: BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1981, at 310 (1981).
11. Mason, supra note 2, at 164.
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Budget does not keep a tally of these private sector outlays, they are
believed to total some 30% of grant payments to state and local govern-
ments.' 2 Given the 96.3 billion dollars of grant funds devoted to state
and local governments, this means an additional 28.9 billion dollars are
budgeted for private grantees.
A parallel to growth in gross expenditures for grants is the growth in
the number of grant programs.' 3 It has been estimated that the number
of institutions and agencies receiving financing under federal grants has
mushroomed to the incredible total of 112,520.'1 This figure includes
some 8,000 community nonprofit organizations and some 900 commu-
nity action agencies."5 Ten years ago, there were 500 federal grant pro-
grams. 16 Now, 57 federal agencies administer 1123 programs.'1  One
author has "crudely guess[ed]" that the federal government is involved
in some 300,000 grant agreements with public and private grantees
each year.'3
Just as important as the size and scope of federal grant programs is
their prominent role in furthering and implementing national policies
established by Congress. Grant programs have come to represent "the
preferred modus operandi of the federal government in carrying out
most of its education, health, social welfare, housing, environmental,
and transportation programs."' 9 Congress has utilized the grant mech-
anism to promote national goals as fundamental and varied as anti-
poverty projects and urban housing, criminal justice and law
enforcement, and pollution control and solid waste disposal.20
The large size, wide scope, and vital importance of federal grant ac-
tivity is not matched by a similarly comprehensive body of law and
12. Id. n.5. One author estimated grants to nongovernment entities at $20 billion to $30
billion for fiscal year 1979 when grants to 3454 state and local governments totaled $82.9 billion.
This is roughly in keeping with the 30% estimate. Madden, The Right to Receive Federal Grants
and Asristance, 37 FED. B.J. 17, 20 n.24 (1978).
13. Mason, supra note 2, at 172.
14. R. CAPPALLI, supra note 7, at 8.
15. Id.
16. Wallick & Montalto, Symbiosis or Dominatio. Rights and Remedies Under Grant-Type
Assistance Programs, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 159, 164 n.21 (1978).
17. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, 1980 CATALOG OF FEDERAL DOMESTIC AsSIsT-
ANCE 11.
18. R. CAPPALLI, supra note 7, at 17.
19. Boasberg & Hewes, "he Washington Beat: Federal Grants andDue Process, 6 UR. LAW.
339, 402 (1974).
20. Id. at 402.
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legal analysis." Surprisingly, the tremendous growth in grant making
has seen little corresponding development of federal grant law, either
in the form of judicial decisions22 or scholarly articles 3 addressing the
legal nature of the federal grant process, the problems of administrative
agency discretion, and the procedural due process rights of federal
grantees. Despite huge expenditures and the ever expanding role of
federal grantees in executing congressional policies, it can still be stated
accurately that federal grant law today is but a "slumbering giant ' 24
only now reluctantly awakening.
Federal grants-in-aid traditionally have been viewed as mere condi-
tional gifts or items of federal largess.25 Grantees therefore have had
none of the rights and safeguards afforded those carrying out congres-
sional programs under contract, for whom general contract law ap-
plies.26 Instead, the grantee "is most often looked upon as an object of
21. One commentator has written bluntly, "Grant law is a discipline that does not yet exist."
Mason, supra note 2, at 164. See also Wallick & Montalto, supra note 16, at 162 n.12. Professor
Cappalli inquires what it is about the field that causes lawyers to look the other way. R. CAP-
PALLI, supra note 7, at 362.
22. Very little litigation has been brought in the area of federal grants. See Southern Mut.
Help Ass'n v. Califano, 574 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1977); National Ass'n of Regional Councils v.
Costle, 564 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1977); National Ass'n of Neighborhood Centers v. Mathews, 551
F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1976); National Consumer Information Center v. Gallegos, 549 F.2d 822
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Mil-ka-ko Research & Dev. Corp. v. Office of Economic Opportunity, 352 F.
Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1972), af'dmem, 492 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
23. Only recently has a small body of scholarly material been published. See Boasberg &
Feldesman, supra note 3; Brown, Federal Funds and National Supremacy: The Role o/State Legis-
latures in Federal Grant Programs, 28 AM. U.L. REv. 279 (1979); Brown, Federal Funds and Fed-
eral Courts-Community Development Litigation As A Testing Ground for the New Law of
Standing, 21 B.C.L. REv. 525 (1980); Cappalli, Federal Grant Disputes: The Lawyer's Next Do-
main, I 1 URB. LAw. 377 (1979); Catz, Standing to Challenge Federal Grant Termination, 19 URB.
L. ANN. 87 (1980); Conway, The Federal Grant: An Administrative View, 30 FED. B.J. 119 (1971);
Mason, supra note 2; Tomlinson & Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-in-Aid
Programs: Suggestions for Benefciary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REv. 600 (1972); Wallick &
Montalto, supra note 16; Whelan & Smith, Contracts Under Grants-in-Aid-An Aspect of Federal-
State-Local Relations, 6 HASTINrs CONsT. L.Q. 751 (1979); Wilcox, The Function and Nature of
Grants, 22 AD. L. REV. 125 (1970).
24. The metaphor was coined by U.S. Circuit Judge Tamm in Southern Mut. Help Ass'n v.
Califano, 574 F.2d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
25. See Boasberg & Hewes, supra note 19, at 400; Mason, supra note 2, at 181. For a view-
point characterizing the notion of grants as conditional gifts as "pernicious," see Wallick &
Montalto, supra note 16, at 161.
26. When disputes arise in defense contracts, for example, the disputes clause controls, and it
provides (in pertinent part), "In connection with any appeal proceeding under this clause, the
contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of his
appeal." 32 C.F.R. § 7.103.12 (1979). Regarding due process rights of bidders on federal con-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss4/1
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federal charity, without any legal 'right' to agency largess." 27 This view
of grant making and grantees may now be yielding to a growing recog-
nition of the importance of federal grants that parallels their growth in
fiscal dimensions. There is increasing awareness that grantees deserve
legal protection because of the potentially disastrous results of unfavor-
able action by the federal grantor.28
Cognizant of their vital role in implementing federal policies and of
the inherent risks of dealing with the federal bureaucracy, grantees
"more and more feel they have a right to the benefits to be obtained
under grants and the courts more and more tend to agree with them."29
tracts, see Note, Due Process in Public Contracts: Pre-A ward Hearings to Determine Aesponsibility
ofBidders, 5 PAC. L.J. 142 (1974).
27. Boasberg & Hewes, supra note 19, at 400. See also Calm & Calm, The New Sovereign
Immunity, 81 HARV. L. REV. 929, 934 (1968). Not all grants are of one type: two basic varieties
are formula grants and project grants.
Formula grants are distributed to all states according to a predetermined formula spelled
out in the enabling statute. A state must normally submit a plan for approval by the
federal agency administering the program in order to qualify for its share of the
funds .... Because a state which has an approved plan on file with the federal agency
is entitled as a matter of right to the continued payment of its share of any funds author-
ized and appropriated by Congress for the program, formula grants are sometimes re-
ferred to as mandatory grants.
Project grants are disbursed to eligible recipients for specific projects on the basis of
project applications .... Recipients are usually local units of government or private
entities rather than states, as in the case of formula grants. Project grants rely on local
initiative and local sensing of needs in requesting funds and in following up applications.
Often referred to as discretionary grants, project grants are far more flexible than
formula grants and allow federal administrators considerable discretion in deciding
which project applications deserve funding.
Tomlinson & Mashaw, supra note 23, at 600-01. It is the project grant that is most often perceived
as a gift, but note that the line between project and formula grants is not always distinct. Id. at
601.
28. Boasberg & Hewes, supra note 19, at 402. If, for example, a grant received annually in
the past is not renewed, "fe]xperienced professional staff must be abruptly laid off; office leases
terminated; equipment and furnishings returned; and often the grantee itself must go out of busi-
ness." Id. In addition to these substantial fiscal injuries, sudden nonrenewal may cause substan-
tial injury by foreclosing future opportunities of the grantee and causing it certain "stigmatic
effects." R. CAPPALLI, supra note 7, at 212.
29. Mason, supra note 2, at 181. The author continues:
This concept of a right to a grant derives from several sources. The first is the consti-
tutional necessity of treating all people similarly situated equally. . . .[Grantees] have a
right to some objective assurance that the discretion in awarding the grant has been
exercised fairly and even-handedly.
A second element that goes into the drive towards entitlement is the strong value we
place on established patterns. If a grantee has received a grant, he expects when renewal
time comes to get a renewal and his expectation of renewal is not without jurisprudential
value. ...
The third is the simple political fact that the grantee's bargaining position may be very
great.
Id.
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It should also follow that if a colorable argument can be made that
there is a right to federal grants, meaningful remedies to protect that
right should be made available."
Although there has been no express, unequivocal judicial recognition
of a grantee's right to a due process hearing,3' some federal agencies'
regulations provide for grant termination hearings. 32 It has been ob-
served, however, that even those agency regulations that allow for ad-
ministrative hearings often "do not accord the grantee with many
traditional due process rights."
33
Confronted by a reticent judiciary and confounded by the inade-
quacy of administrative remedies, "[t]here are growing indications...
that the grantees and beneficiaries of many grant programs are without
recourse in the face of autocratic decisions or indifference by federal
administrators, who are unaccountable to a popular constituency and
may be insensitive or unsympathetic to local problems and
conditions. 34
Unable to enforce due process rights at the administrative level, dis-
appointed grantees have turned to the courts as the next logical place to
seek relief.35 In fact, as federal grant-in-aid programs continue to ex-
pand, the question of grantee rights has surfaced as an issue the federal
courts are being asked to address with increasing frequency.36
This Article focuses on two potential sources of a grantee's right to
30. Wallick & Montalto, supra note 16, at 161.
31. Boasberg & Hewes, supra note 19, at 405-06. Cf. Wallick & Montalto, supra note 16, at
186 (such due process safeguards as are available to the grantee will tend to vary with the context
in which they are asserted). Somewhat more due process will be available to a grantee facing
termination of his grant than to a would-be grantee facing an unfavorable decision on his initial
grant-application. Between these extremes there will likely be numerous other gradations. Id.
32. See notes 306-16 infra and accompanying text.
33. Boasberg & Hewes, supra note 19. "For example, there is no right to an independent
hearing examiner... no grantee right to make depositions of agency officials... or to inspect
internal agency documents. . . [nior is there a requirement that the agency make its program
officers available at the hearing." Id. at 405-06. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 1067.2-4 (1980), which
allows for "informal" "show cause" hearings when the Community Services Administration de-
nies refunding applications of grantees receiving funding under the Community Services Act of
1974.
34. Tomlinson & Mashaw, supra note 23, at 618-19. See also Calm & Cahn, supra note 27.
35. Regarding possible consequences of a due process litigation explosion, see Mason, supra
note 2, at 183 n.107 and accompanying text.
36. Southern Mut. Help Ass'n v. Califano, 574 F.2d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See National
Consumer Information Center v. Gallegos, 529 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Red School House, Inc.
v. Office of Economic Opportunity, 386 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Minn. 1974); Mil-ka-ko Research &
[Vol. 59:1067
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some kind of hearing to review a federal agency's decision to terminate
the grant relationship. The main objective is to demonstrate that the
grantee has a property and/or liberty interest in the grant, which trig-
gers procedural due process guarantees, and that the process due is no-
tice of the possible deprivation of the grant and a pretermination
hearing. The grantee of federal assistance programs has more than a
mere expectancy of continued funding.37 Although the source of a
claim of entitlement may not be explicit in the statutes and rules deal-
ing with assistance programs, it is implicit in the overall operation of
the particular government programs.38
II. THE NATURE OF AND CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSE BEHIND
FEDERAL GRANTS
Neither the statutes creating the various federal assistance programs
nor the agency regulations implementing those programs give a precise
definition of the term "grant." Congress has recently attempted to pro-
vide some guidelines for characterizing the relationships between the
federal government and the recipient of assistance and for distinguish-
ing those relationships from ones created by government contracting.
The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 197731 states
that a procurement contract shall be used whenever the principal pur-
pose is the acquisition by purchase, lease, or barter of property or serv-
ices for the direct benefit or use of the federal government.40 The Act
does not define the term "grant," but it states that a type of grant agree-
Dev. Corp. v. Office of Economic Opportunity, 352 F. Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1972), af'dmen , 492
F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
37. Mason, supra note 2, at 181. The Supreme Court has held that a mere "unilateral expec-
tation" of a benefit does not confer a property interest. Rather, there must be "a legitimate claim
of entitlement to it." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
38. Entitlement to a particular benefit or status may be very real even though not explicit.
For example, a person's interest in retaining state funded employment "is a 'property' interest for
due process purposes if there are ... rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his
claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing." Perry v. Sinderman, 408
U.S. 593, 601 (1972). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S, 565 (1975) (statutory claim of entitlement
arising from state laws establishing public schools and requiring attendance defines a property
interest protected by due process); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 335 (1971) (entitlement in driver's
license prohibits revocation absent due process).
39. 41 U.S.C. §§ 501-509 (1976).
40. 41 U.S.C. § 503 (1976). The Act does not actually define a procurement contract but
instead provides that executive agencies shall use a type of procurement contract as the legal
instrument which reflects the relationship between the federal government and the other party
whenever the principal purpose of that relationship is as mentioned in the text. The Act also
1073Number 4]
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ment is to be used whenever federally authorized public service pro-
grams are to be implemented through the transfer of property, services,
money, or other items of value to any nonfederal recipient, ranging
from a state government to a private individual.'
The Act was a direct result of the recommendations of the Report of
the Commission on Government Procurement issued in December
1972.42 The Commission recommended legislation that would differen-
tiate between procurement relationships and assistance relationships by
limiting the use of the terms "grant," "grant-in-aid," and "cooperative
agreement" to the latter, while reserving use of the term "contract"
solely to the former. The Commission further recommended a compre-
hensive study to examine alternative means of implementing federal
assistance programs and to determine the feasibility of developing a
system of guidance for the use of grants, cooperative agreements, and
other forms of assistance in carrying out federal assistance programs. 3
The Commission found that grant-type activities clearly impinged on
procurement issues because grants and contracts can be used inter-
changeably. The Commission considered the extent to which procure-
ment rules and regulations are or should be applied to grant-type
assistance. It found that federal grant activities comprise a vast array
of assistance programs, functioning inconsistently and lacking central
guidance. This lack of organization frequently leads to federal agen-
cies using grants to eliminate competition or to achieve objectives bet-
ter met by procurement contracts. The Commission thought these
agency practices to be inappropriate.44
As mentioned earlier, the Act was primarily intended to distinguish
between federal grant/cooperative agreement relationships and federal
procurement activities. By doing so, it was hoped that the Act would
provides for the use of procurement contracts whenever a federal agency determines in a specific
instance that its use is appropriate. See Wallick & Montalto, supra note 16, at 162-63.
41. 41 U.S.C. § 504(1) (1976).
42. "The Commission was created by Public Law 91-129 in November 1969 to study and
recommend to Congress methods to promote 'the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness' of pro-
curement by the executive branch of the Federal Government." S. REP. No. 449, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 11, 13.
43. 3 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 162, 168 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as REPORT OF THE COMMISSION]. Subsequently, these recommendations were em-
bodied in S. 1437, the forerunner of the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act. S. REP.
No. 449, supra note 42, at 3.
44. S. REP. No. 449, supra note 42, at 7. See 3 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION, .rupra note 43,
at 153-75.
[Vol. 59:1067
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begin to alleviate confusion as to the characteristics of the various legal
instruments used in transactions involving the government. Accompa-
nying the elimination of confusion would be a reduction in ineffective-
ness and waste. Additionally, the Act defines the relationship between
the federal government and nonfederal agencies. 45
Sections 503, 504, and 505 require that the legal instruments used to
effect transactions between nonfederal recipients and the federal gov-
ernment correspond to the types of relationships established.46 Con-
gress hoped that through the enactment of a statute providing these
guidelines, executive agencies would be required to make conscious de-
cisions that reasonably could be justified on the basis of the instruments
chosen to reflect the basic nature of the relationship. 47 The three sec-
tions set uniform statutory guidelines on when executive agencies
should use a grant rather than a contract. Their requirements are
aimed at reducing confusion, preventing certain abuses, and reordering
inconsistent practices that have resulted from the dearth of central leg-
islative direction.48 The Act further establishes guidelines to ensure
that the appropriate type of legal instrument is selected for use in any
given transaction. Through standardization both of the selection of in-
struments and of the terminology used therein, the Act is intended to
define clearly the roles and responsibilities of the respective parties to
the transaction.49
Possibly more important than the specific provisions of the Act itself
is its requirement that a comprehensive two-year study be undertaken
both to examine other ways of administering federal assistance pro-
grams and to explore the possibility of creating a comprehensive system
for directing and overseeing the use of grants, cooperative agreements,
and other forms of assistance in carrying out federal assistance pro-
grams.50 The study may be important with regard to the rights of the
grantee because there are indications that Congress intended that the
study, through developing a comprehensive system of guidance for
assistance programs, should give attention to problems faced by volun-
tary human services organizations, the burden of unnecessary adminis-
45. S. REP. No. 449, stupra note 42, at 2.
46. Id. at 8. Note that the criteria spelled out in these sections do not determine the exact
clauses and conditions contained in the instruments. Id.
47. Id. at 9.
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id.
50. 41 U.S.C. § 507 (1976). See also REPORT OF THE COMMISSION, supra note 43, at 168.
1075Number 4]
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trative standards, and the rights of such organizations in event of
disputes.5" The study is to consider carefully the findings and recom-
mendations of the Commission on Government Procurement, and will
examine the possibility of developing a centralized system. 2
Although Congress recognized that there were problems in the grant
process and that it needed to develop devices to protect grantees' rights
in event of disputes, the Act represents only an initial step in bringing
some order to the grant process. Any further steps, especially in the
area of grant disputes and protection for grantees, await further con-
gressional action.
In general, then, a grant is "an award of assistance authorized, and
meeting an express need recognized, by statute. ' 53 The grant does not
necessarily fill a specified requirement or need of the government, but it
helps the grantee or third party in an undertaking of his own that the
government aids because of a generally defined and created congres-
sional policy.5 4 Every grant, however, does have stated objectives and
limiting terms and conditions with which the grantee must comply,
even though his specific goals may predominate.
Federal assistance programs typically are classified according to
three types of grants: (1) categorical grants, (2) block grants, and
(3) general revenue sharing.5 Categorical grants are themselves di-
vided into four areas: (1) formula grants, (2) project grants,
51. S. REP. No. 1180,94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), excerpted in S. REP. No. 449, supra note 42,
at 32.
Similar legislation was introduced in the 93rd Congress, H.R. 9060 and S. 3514, and in the 94th
Congress, H.R. 15499 and S. 1437. Congress unanimously passed the Federal Grant and Cooper-
ative Agreement Act of 1976 on October 1, 1976, and the President pocket vetoed the bill. In the
95th Congress, the House and Senate reintroduced legislation that had passed in the 94th Con-
gress: H.R. 7691, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978); S. 431, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978). See H.R. REP.
No. 481, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978); S. REP. No. 1180, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reafrmedby
S. 431, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978); S. REP. No. 1239, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reaffrmedby S.
431, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978).
For the complete legislative history, see S. REP. No. 449, supra note 42, at 3-6.
52. 41 U.S.C. § 507 (1976).
53. Mason, supra note 2, at 166.
54. Id. The authorizing statute may, in fact, be drawn in very broad and general terms-one
reason being that Congress may have no idea of the manner in which the problem should be
attacked. This may allow for grantee experimentation and flexibility in structuring the program,
but it may also have the unfortunate result, from the grantee's viewpoint, of giving broad discre-
tion to the grantor agency.
55. Madden, supra note 12, at 37 (citing ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, CATEGORICAL GRANTS: THEIR ROLE AND DESIGN 5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
A.C.I.R.]).
[Vol. 59:1067
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(3) formula-project grants, and (4) open-ended reimbursement grants. 5 6
The categorical project grant is the primary focus of this Article be-
cause broad discretion is delegated to the federal agencies in awarding
or terminating these grants. These grants can be viewed as being dis-
cretionary because the group of potential recipients may be large or
small, because funds may be available for a great many grants or
merely a few, and because requirements and conditions of the grant
may be provided for in the statute, implied in the legislative history, or
left primarily to agency discretion.57 The Federal Grant and Coopera-
tive Agreement Act treats the categorical project grant as a grant-type
assistance relationship." It is from this type of assistance that most
nonpublic institutional grantees receive their support from the federal
government.
Perhaps because of the wide discretion given the federal agencies in
administering such grant programs, the government continues to per-
ceive the assistance as a conditional gift to the grantee who is the recipi-
ent of federal charity. 9 The government views the grant not as owned
by or vested in the grantees, but rather as held conditionally with the
conditions ensuring the fulfillment of the obligations by the grantee.6 0
As a result, grantees have none of the rights or safeguards of those who
carry out congressional directives under contract. Although the sub-
stantive law of general contracting applies nicely to government con-
tracts, federal grantees are seen as objects of federal charity, without
56. Id. For a further discussion of the different types of grants and their uses, see A.C.I.R.,
supra note 55, at 5. For a discussion of the features of block grants and revenue sharing that are
not covered here because they usually involve state and local governments, see Madden, Future
Directions for Federal 4ssistance Programs: Lessons from Block Grants and Revenue Sharing, 36
FED. BJ. 107 (1977).
57. Wilcox, supra note 23, at 128. When a potential grantee challenged the awarding of
grants by the Environmental Protection Agency, the court found Congress had placed the decision
to award grants squarely within the discretion of the Secretary of Commerce and the EPA to
determine the method of testing applications and to make the ultimate determination of approv-
ing the grants on the basis of the testing. Clark v. Richardson, 431 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.J. 1977).
58. 41 U.S.C. § 504 (1976). OMB Circular A-I 10, Grants and Agreement with Institutions of
Higher Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations-Uniform Administrative Re-
quirements, 41 Fed. Reg. 32,016 (1976), defines grant to mean money or property provided in lieu
of money paid or furnished by the federal government to recipients under programs that provide
financial assistance or that provide support or stimulation to accomplish a public purpose. The
OMB has a separate definition for grants-in-aid when the recipient is a state or local government.
59. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
60. Reich, The New Propery, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 768-71 (1964).
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any legal rights to the continued receipt of grant funds.6
As a result of this traditional governmental view of grants as condi-
tional gifts, certain equitable obligations fall on the grantee.62 Because
the gift has been accepted, the terms and conditions of the gift have
been accepted. These, according to the government, are enforceable
against the grantee in any subsequent litigation. The United States also
holds the power to revoke the grant. Thus, should the granting agency
determine that grant funds are being used for purposes other than those
intended, the agency may demand return of the funds to the federal
government.63 At the same time, the grantee has no rights or interests
in the selection of grantees or continued funding beyond the grant
period.
Arguably, such a view is inconsistent with the realities of the situa-
tion and subverts the constitutional doctrine of federalism. The power
of the federal government to impose reasonable conditions on the use
of federal funds, property, or privileges is well established. 64 However,
there has been a growing recognition that federal grant making is no
less important than federal contracting and, accordingly, that grantees
should be provided with comparable safeguards. Even the government
recognizes that "[no grant is a pure gift, unburdened with enforceable
obligations. Some grantor-grantee interactions are always present.
Every grant has stated objectives and limiting terms, and conditions,
and every grant involves a grantor commitment of support."65
The grant should not be treated as a mere gift. The purpose of the
61. Boasberg & Hewes, supra note 19, at 400. See Cahn & Cahn, supra note 27, at 934.
62. See Conway, supra note 23, at 122-25; Wallick & Montalto, supra note 16, at 165-68;
Wilcox, supra note 23, at 127-3 1.
63. Conway, supra note 23, at 123. It is a typical case of the agency wanting its cake and
eating it, too. The agency retains all rights to grant funds and property, yet it does not want to
give any rights to the grantee, which it views merely as a conduit.
64. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1967); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S.
275, 295 (1958); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947).
65. Wallick & Montalto, supra note 16, at 166. "The grantor can terminate only for cause or
with mutual consent--otherwise the transaction has become wholly illusory and no valid commit-
ment of government funds has been made." Mason, supra note 2, at 167. See G.A.O. AccouNT-
ING PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES, 16.8(c), at 2-53 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as G.A.O.]. See generall, Burke v. Southern Pac. R.R., 234 U.S. 669 (1914). A statute was
enacted stating if railroads would locate, construct and put into operation a designated line of
railroad, then patents would be issued to the company confirming in it the right and title to the
public lands falling within the descriptive terms of the grant. When the railroad performed its
part, it was entitled to the issuance of the patents; the government could not treat the lands as a
gift, yet to be delivered.
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grant is to carry out some public interest, as defined by Congress, with
the resulting advantages to the government and the public.66 That pub-
lic interest, as defined by Congress, signifies a congressional determina-
tion that public funds should be expended to accomplish a particular
public purpose and/or policy but that they should be handled through
private means.67 Even though the government limits the grantee's
grant funds by expecting the grantee to act as an agent of the public
interest and in conformity with the grant's specific requirements, the
government still aids the grantee in an undertaking of its own in which
its goals structure the program.68 The grantee has a right to complete
his undertaking and to see that his goals are accomplished. A refusal to
renew a grant, or its termination, or a similar action taken unilaterally,
may deprive the grantee of this right and may destroy the grantee's
autonomy and freedom in structuring the program, the very interests
Congress sought to promote when it created the grant.69
In view of these important interests-that of the federal government
in achieving the implementation of congressionally ordained policies
and that of the grantee in achieving fulfillment of its public service mis-
sion-the network of expectations created by the establishment of grant
programs should not be disturbed lightly by unilateral actions. This is
66. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1936); Burke v. Southern Pac. R.R., 234 U.S. 669
(1914). It is a carrying out of a congressional determination of a national purpose. Some criticism
may be leveled at the use of older cases here and in the notes to follow since they all dealt with
land grants to corporations or institutions. Because the land grant was the only transaction be-
tween the grantor and the grantee, there was no continuous relationship between the two as there
is in today's grants. The land grant, however, was subject to conditions, and the government
could have the land returned to them for a failure to comply with those conditions. The basic
relationship involved is similar enough to apply some of the principles.
67. This Article focuses on discretionary grants, most of which go to a nonpublic institutional
grantee. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
68. Mason, supra note 2, at 167.
69. That grants are intended to marshal and enlist federal resources in support of projects
deemed worthy of federal resources is often implicit in the statutory language authorizing grant
aid. Professor Cappalli in describing project grants gives an example ofone such statute, the Solid
Waste Disposal Act of 1976:
The Administrator ... shall conduct, and encourage, cooperate with, and render
financial and other assistance to appropriate public ... authorities, agencies and institu-
tions, private agencies and institutions, and individuals in the conduct of, and promote
the coordination of, research, investigations, experiments, training, demonstrations,
surveys, public education programs, and studies. ...
42 U.S.C. § 6981(a) (Supp. III 1979). See R. CAPPALLI, supra note 7, at 43. As one commentator
has written, "The grant is dominated by the grantee's goal and his autonomy. ... The grant is
assistance to an autonomous grantee. The grantee is not an arm, agent or instrumentality of the
grantor." Mason, supra note 2, at 167.
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especially important because in most cases, adverse grantor decisions
are based on a finding of some kind of grantee misconduct that, given
the complex nature of the grant field, may be open to considerable
doubt.70 When important interests are at stake and the possibility of
mistake is substantial, common sense suggests devising some procedu-
ral protections to guard against unwise grant decisions.7' Before these
procedural protections can be devised, however, the exact nature of the
interest held by federal grantees must be determined. This issue neces-
sarily precedes resolution of the question of how best to protect due
process rights.
III. FEDERAL GRANTEE RIGHTS: TRADITIONAL THEORIES
As long as the grantee is seen as having no rights in the grant, both
the legal and the political basis for government power at the expense of
the grantee's autonomy and freedom are increased. 2 Because this
characterization of the grantee's interest is often perceived as creating
inequities, courts and legal scholars in recent years have advanced the
70. Professor Cappalli notes, "Grantees are usually sophisticated and wise enough to avoid
obvious violations of the grant. Most of the alleged illegalities will stem from unclear federal
policies or a confusing backdrop of facts. In more cases than not, noncompliance allegations are
likely to be highly debatable." R. CAPPALLI, supra note 7, at 217.
71. Of course, no procedures can guarantee decision making that is wholly error-free, but
when, as here, "[t]he risk of error is not at all trivial,. . . it should be guarded against if that may
be done without prohibitive cost or interference with" the grant process. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 580 (1975).
72. Reich, supra note 60, at 749. The focus of Professor Reich's article is on what he calls
"government largess," the entire class of benefits and status flowing from government to individu-
als. Although he believes these items can help to promote abundance in society, he is concerned
that they may simultaneously cause an imbalance in the political relations between government
and citizens. To meet the problem, Professor Reich suggests that a new theory of property and
property rights be developed. It is time, he writes,
for us to remember what the framers of the Constitution knew so well--that "a power
over a man's subsistence is a power over his will." We cannot safely entrust our liveli-
hoods, and our rights to the discretion of authorities, examiners, boards of control, char-
acter committees, regents or license commissioners ...
If the individual is to survive in a collective society, he must have protections against
its ruthless pressures.
Id. at 787. The problem in the grant context is to find a proprietary interest in the grantee that
entitles him to procedural protections. The problem can overlap with questions of substantive due
process. When an agency can terminate a grant without any statement of reasons or without
providing a hearing, the termination may be based on the exercise of constitutional rights. Denial
of employment or property based upon an exercise, for example, of the right of association pro-
tected by the first amendment is impermissible. See generally Kirk, Massive Subsidies and Aca-
demic Freedom, 28 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 607 (1963).
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idea that the grantee does have at least some rights in the grant.73
A. The Contract Theory ofFederal Grant Law
One theory that provides grantees with vested rights in the grant is
the contract theory. The grantor-grantee relationship has been viewed
as fulfilling all the classic elements of a contract.74 Competent parties,
proper subject matter, sufficient consideration, and consent are all pres-
ent in the grant relationship.75 The government seeks a result that fur-
thers some national legislative purpose. In return for providing the
money or property to accomplish this purpose, the grantee agrees upon
the acceptance of the grant to use it for the grant purpose in accordance
with grant rules,76 thereby following the classic offer and acceptance
model of contract law. By viewing the grant in this manner, a promis-
sory commitment may be found in nearly every grant relationship.77
Federal assistance often is given subject to specific conditions that
run with the grant. When the recipient accepts the grant, he also ac-
cepts the obligation to act in accordance with these conditions.78 Exe-
cution of a grant agreement or approval of an application establishes a
commitment of funds, and the agreement, application, or similar docu-
ment is the obligating instrument that binds the United States govern-
ment to disburse the grant funds unconditionally or under conditions
solely within the control of the grantee. 79 By acting in the mode con-
templated by such an instrument, the parties are brought into a con-
tractual relationship within the terms of the proposal, which is
obligatory on both. 0 Although the relationship between grantor and
73. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
74. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 316 (1940); Burke v. Southern Pac. R.R., 234
U.S. 669 (1914); McGee v. Mathis, 71 U.S. 142 (1856). See generally 1 S. WILLISTON, TRATISE
ON CONTRACTS § 18 (3d ed. 1957).
75. McGee v. Mathis, 71 U.S. 143, 155 (1866).
76. Mason, supra note 2, at 167. Examples of the various rules the grantor must follow are:
(1) he must submit to an audit, 44 U.S.C. § 393(g) (1976); (2) he must give and live up to civil
rights assurances, merit system, and fair personnel practices requisitions, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)
(1976); and (3) he must follow work hour and minimum pay requirements that protect employees,
40 U.S.C. §§ 276(a), 326 (1976). Id. at 176-77.
77. Wilcox, supra note 23, at 126.
78. United States v. Frazer, 297 F. Supp. 319, 322 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
79. Mason, supra note 2, at 167 n.25 (citing G.A.O., supra note 65, at 1-53).
80. Note, however, that a grantee may terminate unilaterally, whereas the grantor may termi-
nate only for cause or with mutual consent. Of course, should the grantee terminate, it surrenders
its right to further funding. Mason, supra note 2, at 167. But see EPA, General Grant Regulation
and Procedures, which provide that a grantee may not unilaterally terminate the project work for
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grantee varies significantly from that of the parties in a procurement
contract, both are essentially contractual in nature.8' Every grant
agreement expresses objectives and contains limiting terms and condi-
tions that are enforceable against the grantee. 82 Similarly, in every case
the grantor commits itself to providing support to the grantee.8 3 Early
cases seemed to hold that grants created an obligation by which the
grantee could seek enforcement against the federal government as
grantor.84
In one line of cases, the United States Court of Claims concluded
that it had jurisdiction under the Tucker Act85 when an aggrieved
grantee sought enforcement of a grant against a federal agency.86 It is
unclear, however, whether the court exercised jurisdiction on the basis
of a contract or under a statute or regulation.87 The court said that the
which a grant has been awarded, except for good cause. 40 C.F.R. § 30.920-2 (1981). Even if the
grantee should breach this duty, however, the only apparent sanction is for the EPA itself to
terminate the grant. Id. Upon termination the grantee must refund remaining grant funds. 40
C.F.R. § 30.920-4 (1981).
81. Wallick & Montalto, supra note 16, at 166.
82. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). A state "substitute father" regulation denying AFDC
payments to children of a mother who cohabits with an able-bodied man was held invalid because
it defined "parent" in a manner inconsistent with federal law. State enforcement of the regulation
was found a breach of a federally imposed obligation to furnish aid to eligible individuals that the
state assumed by participating in the federal program. The case demonstrates how such a grant-
in-aid program can be treated similarly to a contract. The ruling in Smith was handed down
before the Court placed some limitations on the grant conditions that could be imposed on states
in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397
(1970), the Court, citing Smith, noted that, although participating states were obliged to comply
with the terms of federal legislation, participation itself was "basically voluntary." 397 U.S. at
408.
83. Wallick & Montalto, supra note 16, at 166.
84. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1936); Burke v. Southern Pac. R.R., 234 U.S. 669
(1914); McGee v. Mathis, 71 U.S. 143 (1866). See notes 66 & 75 supra and accompanying text.
The cases involved land grants to states or railroads with improvement or development of the land
as the main objective.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976). The Tucker Act grants the United States Court of Claims juris-
diction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded upon the Constitu-
tion or any act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive agency, or upon any express or
implied contract with the United States.
86. California v. United States, 551 F.2d 843 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (jurisdiction under the Federal
Aid to Highways Act, 23 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977); Texas v. United
States, 537 F.2d 466 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (jurisdiction under the Disaster Relief Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4401
(1976)); Whitecliff, Inc. v. United States, 536 F.2d 347 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (jurisdiction under the Medi-
care portion of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1976)), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977).
87. See, e.g., Whitecliff, Inc. v. United States, 536 F.2d 347 (Ct. Cl. 1976), in which the Court
of Claims expresssly held that 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976) was the basis for its jurisdiction both on
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assistance relationship and the documents in support of it created a
contract. 81 Although the purposes behind a procurement contract and
grant-type assistance differ substantially, the grantee still has a vital
role and a major stake in the various grant programs and their adminis-
tration. 9 In consideration, courts and grantor agencies have increas-
ingly referred to the federal procurement model for resolving
controversies under grant programs.90
The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act9' may be
viewed as providing some support for a contract analysis of the grant
field. As previously discussed, the Act establishes uniform criteria for
the selection of appropriate legal instruments with which to formalize
relationships between the federal government and private contractors,
state and local governments, and other entities that receive federal
funds, property, or services. Congress identified a need to distinguish
procurement relationships from assistance relationships9" and hoped
development of such criteria would meet this need. Execution of "a
type of grant agreement"-the instrument the Act specifies for the crea-
account of the plaintiffs contract claim against the government and because of its claim under
federal law. 536 F.2d at 351.
88. See, e.g., California v. United States, 551 F.2d 843, 850 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 857 (1977). See also Wallick & Chamblee, Bridling the Trojan Horse. Rights andRemedies of
Colleges and Universities Under Federal Grant-Type Assistance Programs, 4 J.C. & U.L. 241
(1977).
89. In general, the grantee must submit a detailed proposal outlining how he will go about
accomplishing the general goal the agency or Congress has set for the program. The grantee puts
the flesh on the skeleton of a grant-in-aid program in a manner of speaking. The grantee invests
considerable amounts of time and energy that should not go unrecognized. The grantee upon
receiving the grant will hire staff members, enter into contracts and leases extending over several
years, purchase any needed equipment, and make the other usual plans for staying in business.
90. An award of a grant has been held to create a relationship between grantor and grantee
that is contractual, not donative. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 494 F.2d 1285 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
Under a Federal-Aid Project Agreement that expressly included a utility adjustment provision,
and in view of payment of state's claim certifying that such amount was approved for payment
and was justly due, the federal government had a contractual obligation to pay the state its pro-
portionate share of the gas company's relocation costs incident to construction of an interstate
highway. .d. at 1288.
In Texas v. United States, 537 F.2d 466 (Ct. CL. 1976), valid execution of a document entitled
"Federal-State Disaster Assistance Agreement," providing that disaster relief funding be made
available, created a binding contract that obligated the United States to provide such assistance as
was called for in the assistance agreement. Id. at 468.
91. 41 U.S.C. §§ 501-509 (Supp. 1111979). For discussion of the Act and its origins, see notes
39-54 supra and accompanying text.
92. 41 U.S.C. § 501e(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
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tion of grant relationships93-will tend, by its form and content, to give
a contractual gloss to a transaction. The legal instrument, combined
with the ease with which one can find a promissory commitment in
almost every grant,94 renders the transaction similar to a formal con-
tract proceeding between the parties.
Thus the perception of a grant as a gift is no longer legally sound; the
law enforces the mutual undertakings in a contractual sense. The Fed-
eral Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act makes perception of the
grant as a gift unnecessary and outdated by recognizing grants as a
special category of assistance relationships. Furthermore, the percep-
tion of the grant as a gift is unrealistic, unwise, and unnecessary in a
world of nearly 100 billion dollars of federal grant support. 5
The principal purposes behind federal contracts and federal grants-
in-aid are, however, generally different. Although the grantor-grantee
relationship is in many ways similar to the contract relationship, there
are several distinguishing factors. One distinguishing factor is the dif-
ference in purpose behind the two systems of transferring money, prop-
erty, or services. Procurement contracts acquire property or secure
services for the direct benefit or use of the federal government.96
Grants or grant-type assistance, on the other hand, involve a transfer of
anything of value to accomplish a public purpose authorized by stat-
ute. This suggests another distinguishing factor: federal grant law is
93. 41 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. III 1979). This section provides:
Use of grant agreements.
Each executive agency shall use a type of grant agreement as the legal instrument
reflecting a relationship between the Federal Government and a State or local govern-
ment or other recipient whenever-
(1) the principal purpose of the relationship is the transfer of money, property, serv-
ices, or anything of value to the State or local government or other recipient in
order to accomplish a public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by
Federal statute, rather than acquisition, by purchase, lease, or barter, of property
or services for the direct benefit or use of the Federal Government; and
(2) no substantial involvement is anticipated between the executive agency, acting
for the Federal Government, and the State or local government or other recipient
during performance of the contemplated activity.
Id.
94. Wilcox, supra note 23, at 126.
95. Perception of grants as conditional gifts is subversion of our constitutional federalism.
See generally 3 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION, supra note 43, at 153.
96. 41 U.S.C. § 503 (Supp. I1 1979). Ordinary government contracts are for the purpose of
procuring facilities, goods, and services for administering the needs of the federal government.
Conway, supra note 23, at 121.
97. 41 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. 111 1979). "A grant is an award of assistance authorized, and
meeting a need recognized, by statute." Mason, supra note 2, at 166.
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purely statutory and therefore, in contrast to contract law, necessarily
involves statutory interpretation.
A further distinguishing factor is that the fights and responsibilities
of the parties are primarily established by instruments outside the
agreement. 98 The grant statute, which has authorized the particular ac-
tivity, and the regulations promulgated by the administrative agency to
implement the program are the principal sources of both the objectives
and the limiting terms and conditions of the grant. This contrasts with
an ordinary contract situation in which the written instrument will nor-
mally contain all the terms and conditions defining the relationship.
The grant agreement plays only the limited role of signaling the start of
the relationship and fixing terms such as the project period, the grant
amount, and the budget.99 Although the grant agreement may or may
not incorporate the statutory and regulatory standards by reference,
those standards will apply, in any event, by their own force and not
because they are mentioned in the agreement.1l° Often, federal grant
programs are described in extremely vague terms because in many
cases flexibility or experimentation in the implementation of grant
projects is consciously sought.' 0' Again, this contrasts to the specificity
sought in the drafting of contracts to cover any possible situation. A
further difference is that the grantee typically is not liable for failure to
perform. 102 Finally, the grantee may, in most cases, terminate the pro-
ject at will.103 This is hardly the case in the contract setting.
The obligations between the grantor and grantee differ substantially
from those customary in federal contracts. The obligation of the
grantee in the use of the grant is to act as the agent of the public interest
rather than solely in the service of his own self interest.'w This obliga-
98. R. CAPPALLI, supra note 7, at 177.
99. Id. at 380.
100. Id. at 54.
101. Id. at 57-58.
102. Wilcox, supra note 23, at 129-30. The Office of Management and Budget considers nonli-
ability one of the essential features of a project grant. OMB, CATALOG OF FEDERAL DOMESTIC
ASSISTANCE XIX (1978).
103. Rubinstein v. Mayor of Baltimore, 295 F. Supp. 108, 111 (D. Md. 1969). See also Mason,
.rupra note 2, at 166. In order to terminate the project at will the grantee must return any federal
funds and property that remain. 34 C.F.R. § 75.496(a)(2) (1981) (Dep't of Education).
104. The public interest for which the grantee is an agent is not merely abstract. "Every grant
program creates benefits not only for the direct recipient of the grant but also for third parties who
have certain enumerated rights under the grant program." Madden, supra note 12, at 49. As a
consequence, the due process issues that are the focus of this Article may be relevant vis-a-vis
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tion is the most significant limitation on the use of federal funds. A
contractee, on the other hand, merely provides a service or product for
the government because it furthers his own interest in making a profit.
B. The Trust Theory of Federal Grant Law
Another commonly advanced theory that provides the grantee some
rights in the grant is the trust theory.'0 5 A grant upon conditions is
analogous to a trust, and acceptance of the grant places the grantee
under an equitable obligation to abide by its conditions. This equitable
obligation is independent of any express agreement on the grantee's
part. The General Accounting Office has concluded that federal grant
funds are held in trust by the grantee.,06
The courts have equated grants to trusts by holding that equitable
obligations devolve on the grantee through the grant relationship be-
cause grants are conditional gifts whose conditions have been ac-
cepted.' 7 The United States is equated with the settlor, because it
"retains an interest in any grant funds such that if the granting agency
determines that the funds are not being used for the purpose of the
more than one type of party. One commentator asks, "When the federal government takes unfa-
vorable action on a grant, to whom is process owed?" R. CAPPALLI, supra note 7, at 36. Although
the answer to this question, like most others in the grant field, is anything but clear, "numerous
courts have recognized that the rights vested by law in ... third parties are judicially enforcea-
ble." Madden, supra note 12, at 50. In support of this proposition, Madden cites Adams v. Rich-
ardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (action brought by black students, citizens, and taxpayers
in which the court found HEW had the duty to initiate fund termination proceedings against
several public universities for the failure to comply with Title VI), and Brown v. Weinberger, 417
F. Supp. 1215 (D.D.C. 1976) (court directed HEW to enforce Title VI mandates within specified
periods of time). Madden, supra note 12, at 50 n.208. Note, however, that plaintiffs were third
party beneficiaries of civil rights legislation that they sought to enforce against federal grantees.
They did not claim a right to due process review of grant fund termination. For a discussion of
the role and rights of third party beneficiaries of federal grants, see R. CAPPALLI, supra note 7, at
35-36, 230-33; Madden, supra note 12, at 49-59.
105. Two commentators who support the trust theory try to measure grantee rights by compar-
ing them to those of a trustee holding funds or property. See Conway, supra note 23; Wilcox,
supra note 23.
106. 51 Comp. Gen. 162 (1971); 47 Comp. Gen. 81 (1967); 42 Comp. Gen. 289 (1962). Note,
however, that opinions of the Comptroller General may also be cited in support of the contract
analogy and the proposition that once a grant is "offered and accepted, a contractual obligation
exists between the Government and the grantee." 51 Comp. Gen. at 166.
107. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1957). Conditional grants were
equated with trusts in Oregon & Cal. R.R. v. United States, 238 U.S. 393 (1915); Wyoming ex rel
Wyoming Agriculture College v. Irvine, 206 U.S. 278 (1907); Steams v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223
(1900).
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grant they must be returned to the Federal Government."' ° Accord-
ing to this trust analogy, the grantee receives legal title to the funds,
facilities, or property, 1°9 and as such may have a sufficient property
interest and thus fall within the protection from arbitrary government
action afforded by the due process clause.' 10
Grantees have not, however, been held to the high fiduciary standard
of responsibility and accountability that is normally applied to a
trustee's handling of the res of a trust. I ' "The courts have not [even
though equating the grant relationship to the trust relationship] found
it necessary either to apply attenuated trust principles when enforcing
obligations created by grants or to hold grantees to the inappropriately
high fiduciary standards. . . typical of trust relationships.""' 2 Beyond
living up to the grant conditions, the grantee is not made accountable
for either the quantity or the quality of his performance. 1 3
The factors that set the grantor-grantee relationship apart from the
federal contracting model' '4 apply with equal force to distinguish the
relationship from a trust. A trust may occur either by a formal agree-
ment or simply by holding property upon conditions agreed upon
orally. When disputes arise between parties in a contract or trust situa-
tion, they are settled either by a provision in the agreement or by appli-
cable principles from, for the most part, the common law. By contrast,
federal grant law is purely statutory.1 5 It is a complex set of rules and
regulations that govern grant activity. Disputes that arise between the
federal grantor and the nonpublic grantee are settled by reference to
108. Conway, supra note 23, at 123.
109. Id. at 124.
110. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (old-age benefits under Social Security
Act).
11. OMB Circular A-1 10, supra note 58. Attachment A-2 establishes as a general rule that
grant funds do not have to be segregated from other funds belonging to the grantee.
112. Wallick & Montalto, supra note 16, at 168.
113. See, ag., Oregon & Cal. R.R. v. United States, 238 U.S. 393 (1915). Lands were granted
to the railroad to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line and upon completion
patents would issue to the railroad company. The company was made a trustee of the lands
granted and the conditions in the grants were treated as covenants and thus enforceable by the
grantor. In Wyoming e. rel Wyoming Agricultural College v. Irvine, 206 U.S. 278 (1907) the
Court held that land grants made for establishment of agricultural colleges, the disposition of the
interest on the land grant fund, and the appropriation must be in accordance with the trust im-
posed upon it by the acts of Congress. Seegeneraly Catz, Land Grant Colleges and Mechaniaton:
A Needfor EnvironmentalAssezsment, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 747 (1979).
114. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
115. R. CAPPALLI, supra note 7, at 177. See also Wilcox, upra note 23.
1087Number 4]
Washington University Open Scholarship
1088 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:1067
the grant statute or the rules and regulations promulgated by the ad-
ministrative agency authorized to implement the statute. The grantee's
nonliability for failure to perform, and his ability to terminate the pro-
ject at will, are also not typical of a trust relationship. Grant adminis-
tration has to be looked upon as a specialized branch of administrative
law that, at this time, has little legal authority to guide it.16
C. Shortcomings of Both Contract and Trust Theories as Applied to
Federal Grants
While both contract and trust theories' " 7 posit the grantee with rights
in the grant, it has not been determined judicially whether these rights
would reach the status of an entitlement and thereby trigger the protec-
tions of procedural due process. Even if such rights were considered an
entitlement under either theory, neither theory by its own force would
give any rights to a potential grantee whose application has been
turned down, to a grantee who is merely not funded again for the next
year, 18 or to a grantee whose grant has been terminated for cause." 9
Disputes that arise between the granting agency and grantee seem to
116. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
117. There has been some mention of a third theory, a partnership theory of grants, but there
is little discussion of it in the literature. The theory can be dismissed summarily notwithstanding
such purely superficial support for the theory as appears in the Urban Mass Transportation Assist-
ance Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. § 1601a (1976). There, reference is made to the purpose of the Act
being "to create a partnership" that can meet urban transportation needs. For the most part,
however, "[n]othing in existing statutes suggests that Congress mean[t] to place upon the federal
grantor the obligations and liabilities assumed by partners in the commercial sense. Courts have
been rightfully unwilling to impose the general liability of a partner upon the federal grantor."
Wallick & Montalto, supra note 16, at 168-69. See, e.g., United States v. Orleans, 425 US. 807
(1976), which held that a community action agency receiving federal funds from the Office of
Economic Opportunity was not a federal agency, nor were its employees federal employees for the
purposes of liability under the Federal Torts Claims Act. In ruling that the federal government
was not liable for the alleged torts of its grantees, the Court held that the real issue was "not
whether the community action agency receives federal money and must comply with federal stan-
dards and regulations, but whether its day-to-day operations are supervised by the Federal Gov-
ernment." 425 U.S. at 815. See also Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1980) (award of
federal grant does not create partnership relationship between government and grantee).
118. This is the situation in which the plaintiffs found themselves in Southern Mut. Help Ass'n
v. Califano, 574 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1977). For a detailed discussion of this case see notes 127-48
infra and accompanying text.
119. Although many agencies do provide the grantee with a hearing, there are no minimal
requirements that apply to all grant projects. Not all agencies require a hearing process. Further-
more, each agency has discretion to determine when it will terminate the relationship and possibly
avoid any hearing process. Health and Human Services (HHS) (formerly HEW) has established a
Department of Grant Appeals Board, 46 Fed. Reg. 43,816 (1981) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R.
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center around these three funding decisions in which the grantee is pro-
vided with no procedural safeguards or constitutional rights. Neither
theory can be seen as affording protection to grantees in any realistic
sense because neither has been accepted by the Supreme Court, or by
the government, in litigation over funding disputes.
IV. 01 WHAT BASIS IS PROCESS DUE?
Notwithstanding the importance of determining the precise nature of
the relationship between the government and the grantee, that determi-
nation remains of only secondary importance to the issue of whether
due process principles apply to the given situation. In making this de-
termination, one must "look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the
interest at stake."' 20 Courts afford due process to protected liberty and
property rights in acknowledgement of the fact that "the Constitution
recognized higher values than speed and efficiency."'' These higher
values do not ensure that grant benefits conferred by the federal gov-
ernment may not be terminated or abridged, but, if such benefits con-
stitute protected interests, the fifth amendment provides procedural
safeguards. Moreover, in the grant field, as in other contexts, it truly
may be said that "[it is procedure that spells much of the difference
between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice."' 22
When statutory benefits are at issue, and they
may be discontinued only on the occurrence of specified reasons or for
cause, the existence of such reasons or cause may be established only after
the recipients of those benefits are given some form of hearing. The es-
sence of due process is that legally generated expectations of continued
receipt of government benefits may not be summarily denied by arbitrary
administrative action. Notice and an opportunity to be heard enable the
recipient of government benefits to retain their benefits by proving to the
administrative agency that specified reasons or causes for termination of
benefits have not occurred.fo
§ 16). The EPA has set up a similar board to review disputed grant decisions. 40 C.F.R. § 1.20
(1980).
120. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972), quoted in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 575-76 (1975). Accord, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972), cited with approvalin Mor-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970); Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
121. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
122. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
123. Klein v. Califano, 586 F.2d 250, 258 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc) (residents of nursing home
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The crucial issue in fifth amendment analysis concerns whether par-
ties seeking its protections have a legitimate claim to government pro-
gram benefits and whether their claim may be justified objectively. For
example, tenants of a federally financed housing project have a valid,
statutorily created interest in the receipt of low cost housing benefits.
Since their expectancy of continued receipt of those benefits may be
justified objectively, their claim is cognizable under the fifth amend-
ment. Tenants are entitled to notice of rent increases, an opportunity to
make written objections, and receipt of a concise statement from the
Federal Housing Authority stating the reasons for its actions.1
24
In the grant context, one must inquire whether and to what extent
the grantee possesses similar interests. A right to due process for the
federal grantee is predicated on a showing of a legitimate claim of enti-
tlement to grant benefits. Furthermore, any effort to characterize the
grantee's interest in grant benefits raises another closely related ques-
tion: what is an appropriate funding period? The nature of grant pro-
grams causes some projects to extend longer than one or even two
years.1 25 Some degree of certainty about the continuity of project fund-
ing is desirable, because it permits the project investor to plan more
adequately, to attract better assistants, and to make more judicious use
of resources. The grant project may be planned to last over several
receiving medicaid funding had property interest in continued occupancy and were entitled to
hearing prior to fund termination). Klein was subsequently overruled by the Supreme Court in a
companion case, Town Court Nursing Center v. Beal, 586 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc), re'd
sub nom. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 444 U.S. 819 (1980) (patients have no interest
in a particular health facility that entitles them to a pre-transfer hearing). See also Schwartz v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 578 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (when one has no procedural
due process rights apart from those that the agency has chosen to create by its own regulations,
scrupulous compliance with those regulations is required to avoid any injustice).
124. Geneva Towers Tenant Organization v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483,
489, 492 (9th Cir. 1974). Note that, prior to deciding the precise procedures federal housing offi-
cials were required to provide, the circuit court first had to determine whether the deprivation
allegedly threatened concerned a specific benefit Congress had intended to bestow on the plaintiff
tenants.
125. Professor Cappalli has observed that the standard practice of grantor agencies is to limit
project periods to a single year notwithstanding that the nature of a program may logically require
a longer project period. At the same time, many grantor agencies have recognized that no allow-
ance for multi-year funding would impose artificial limitations on some grantees. R. CAPPALLI,
supra note 7, at 301. A regulation promulgated by the Office of Education in 1976 governing
projects awarded for the Consumers' Education Program is illustrative of this purpose: "While
grant applications may be filed proposing multi-year projects, it is expected that a substantial
proportion of projects funded by the Commissioner in any fiscal year will have a project duration
of only one year." 45 C.F.R. § 160e,5(a) (1976) (removed 1979).
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years, but the budgetary process occurs on an annual basis.' 26 Even
though the grantor agency and the grantee expect the project to last
over several years, the grantee must have his grant renewed each year.
Should the funding period be matched with the project period, or
should it be the same as the budget period? Problems arise when the
grantee's expectations for an appropriate funding period do not coin-
cide with the agency's treatment or view of the funding period.
A. Due Process on Non- Constitutional Grounds
It was confusion over project periods and funding periods, combined
with disagreement about the extent of a grantee's entitlement to the
continued receipt of grant benefits, that led to litigation in Southern
Mutual Help Association v. Califano. 27 The plaintiff in the case was
Southern Mutual Help Association (SMHA), a nonprofit corporation
organized under the laws of Louisiana to provide social services to sug-
arcane cutters and migrant workers. In 1971, under authority of the
Migrant Health Act,'2 8 the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
126. Annual budgeting is a consequence of a budgetary process tied to the congressional ap-
propriations processes. Although a grantor agency may commit itself to a multiyear project, there
is real difficulty-and hesitancy-in guaranteeing funding beyond one year, given the vagaries of
congressional appropriations. R. CAPPALLI, supra note 7, at 302.
The limitations that are part of any award of grant funds are typified by the following regula-
tion promulgated by the Public Health Service in 1976 that is applicable to grants for community
health services: "Neither the approval of any project not any grant award shall commit or obli-
gate the United States in any way to make any additional, supplemental, continuation, or other
award with respect to any project or portion thereof. For continuation support, grantees must
make separate application." 42 C.F.R. § 51c.106(c) (1980). Given that any commitment for
multi-year funding is "highly conditional," the decision of whether to award a grantee a so-called
continuation grant presents the federal grantor with an additional opportunity for the exercise of
discretion. R. CAPPALLI, supra note 7, at 302. The Office of Education's regulations governing the
National Reading Improvement Program, for example, set forth several typical bases of review
relevant to a determination of whether Reading Improvement Projects should be continued. They
include: Grantee compliance with applicable regulations, project effectiveness, and the extent to
which a continuation of assistance furthers the involvement in the project of additional schools
and students. See 45 C.F.R. § 162.17(e) (1978).
127. 574 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 242(h) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 247(d) (1976)). That section (in
pertinent part) authorized the Secretary of what was then the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare (HEW):
(1) to make grants to public and other non-profit agencies, institutions, and organiza-
tions for paying part of the cost of (i) establishing and operating family health service
clinics for domestic agricultural migratory workers and their families. . . and (ii) special
projects to improve.., the health conditions of domestic agricultural migratory work-
ers and their families... and (2) to encourage and cooperate in programs for the pur-
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fare (HEW) awarded SMHA a grant to establish and operate a family
health service clinic for migrant farmworkers and sugarcane cutters in
southwestern Louisiana. Along with a letter announcing the award of
the grant, SMHA received an HEW form entitled "Notice of Grant
Awarded" that established a five-year "project period" and "grant pe-
riod" of July 1, 1971, to June 30, 1976. The notice also referred to an
approved one-year "budget period" of July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1972.129
SMHA filed applications required for continued refunding in fiscal
years 1972 and 1973, and these applications were approved. In both
years, SMHA received a revised "Notice of Grant Award," again indi-
cating the same five-year project period as well as the fiscal year budget
period. These revised notices did not mention a "grant period" or
"grant expiration date."' 30
On June 6, 1974, HEW informed SMHA that its 1974 application for
continued funding was not to be approved.13' The Department de-
cided to award funding to a competing applicant because of what was
termed SMHA's "cumbersome and unresponsive project administra-
tion.'"  The Department listed six areas of concern motivating its
decision. 33
Although SMHA notified HEW of its intention to challenge and ap-
peal the adverse decision, HEW informed the grantee on June 25, 1974,
that HEW's nonrenewal decision did not constitute grant termination
and that for this reason rules governing grant termination procedures
were inapplicable. The HEW Grant Appeals Board dismissed a formal
application for review for want of jurisdiction on the ground that the
denial of continued funding was not termination of an existing grant,
but rather a pre-award decision relating to application for an addi-
pose of improving health services, for or otherwise improving the health conditions of
domestic agricultural migratory workers and their families.
Id. This section was subsequently renumbered and amended, in 1974 and 1975 respectively. See
42 U.S.C. § 247(d) (1976). It was the 1970 version of the section that governed SMHA's grant,
however, and, of course, the Southern Mutual court relied on that version in its decision. This is in
contrast to mandatory block formula, and open-ended reimbursement grants, in which Congress
establishes conditions and directs that payments be made to all members of the eligible class who
meet those conditions. These types of grants can be described as "entitlement grants." Their
intended beneficiaries may demand participation as a legal right.
129. 574 F.2d at 520.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 521-22.
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tional grant.' 34
On August 28, 1974, SMHA brought suit in U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and
money damages. SMHA argued that HEW regulations, the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA), and the due process clause of the fifth
amendment required the defendants to provide a hearing prior to any
decision against continued funding. SMHA appealed the district
court's grant of the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 135
The core of the dispute involved a disagreement about the extent and
duration of the grant benefits SMHA was entitled to receive. The spe-
cific issue was whether the challenged HEW decision divested SMHA
of a vested present interest in the continued receipt of grant benefits or
whether that decision pertained to a new and independent grant of ad-
ditional benefits in which SMHA had no present entitlement. Resolu-
tion of this issue was a prerequisite to the question of whether the
plaintiff was entitled to procedural protections.
After considering and rejecting appellee HEW's contention that
SMHA lacked standing to sue,' 36 the circuit court examined the merits
of the plaintiffs claims, the first being that HEW departmental regula-
134. Id. at 521. For jurisdiction of the Grant Appeals Board, see 45 C.F.R. § 16.5 (1980).
135. 574 F.2d at 521.
136. Id. at 522-25. In addressing the standing issue, the court in Southern Mutual focused on
two standing requirements: the Article III case or controversy requirement and the nonconstitu-
tional prudential requirement.
As to the Article III limitation, the court cited Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion, 426 U.S. 26 (1976), for the proposition that a plaintiff has standing to assert an otherwise
justifiable claim when he "has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision." 426 U.S. at 38. The court held that SMHA had met this 'injury in fact'
requirement for standing by its allegation that the HEW action it challenged had damaged its
reputation and good name. Because reputation was found to be a key element in agency grant
decisions, the court was able to find that the cloud HEW had placed over SMHA might lead to an
"inhospitable reception" for the plaintiff's future grant applications, thereby threatening the "very
lifeblood" of SMHA's existence. 574 F.2d at 524. Because this alleged injury could be redressed
by a judicial remedy, SMHA was able to meet the Article III standing test.
In regard to the nonconstitutional prudential standing limitation, the circuit court cited Associa-
tion of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Camp estab-
lished, apart from any case or controversy test, a requirement that the interest a plaintiff seeks to
protect be "arguably within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question." 397 U.S. at 153. As applied to SMHA, the "zone test,"
which was held to be "a quite generous standard," required scrutiny of the Migrant Health Act.
See note 128 supra and regulations issued under authority of the Act. The circuit court found that
Congress, in that Act, had recognized that conduit organizations such as SMHA were necessary
"to deliver the services contemplated." Accordingly, the court had "no trouble" in concluding
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tions required a hearing prior to adverse action. HEW argued that the
action it had taken "was not 'termination', but rather a 'pre-award deci-
sion to an application for the additional grant.' ",-37 It stated that al-
though it had approved SMHA for a five-year project in 1971, the
project was made up of five separate and individual one-year grants
and corresponding budget periods. SMHA was required to reapply
each year for each one-year grant. Thus the 1974 decision not to re-
fund was not a termination at all because the grant for fiscal 1974 was
unaffected and grants for the final two years had not yet vested.138
The court rejected this argument, holding that the case was an inap-
propriate one in which to give deference to an agency's interpretation
of its own rules.' 39 Instead, the court took notice of the logic behind
the establishment of the HEW grant appeals process: "to afford to ag-
grieved grantees maximum due process."' 40 Regulations providing for
this grant appeals process defined "termination" as "the termination of
the grantee's authority to charge allowable costs to a grant prior to the
grant expiration date in the grant award document."'' The court held
that the grant expiration date in the grant award document was June
30, 1976-the date appearing originally in SMHA's 1971 award notice.
This finding led to the conclusion that the decision not to refund
SMHA for fiscal 1974 was, as the grantee asserted, a termination and
not a pre-award decision. 142
Having accepted SMHA's assertion that its grant had been termi-
nated by HEW, the court agreed that the HEW Grant Appeals Board,
that SMHA had asserted an interest that was "arguably within the zone of interests" protected by
that Act. 574 F.2d at 523.
For a more detailed examination of the standing issues as they affect grantees generally, and as
they arose in Southern Mutual particularly, see Catz, supra note 23.
137. 574 F.2d at 526.
138. Id. HEW in its argument relied on 42 C.F.R. § 56.107(a) (1974). For the text of a very
similar regulation, see note 126 supra. That this reliance may have been misplaced is indicated by
the court's awareness that the regulation had been rescinded. 574 F.2d at 526 n.41. Note, how-
ever, that another similar regulation was included in the same Part 56 in 1976. 42 C.F.R.
§ 56.106(c) (1980).
139. 574 F.2d at 526-27.
140. Id. at 525 (quoting 37 Fed. Reg. 24,676 (1972)).
141. 45 C.F.R. § 16.3(i) (1975).
142. 574 F.2d at 527. The court also noted that a finding of termination was in accord with
another definition in Title 45: "'Termination' means the cancellation of Federal Assistance, in
whole or in part, under a grant at any time prior to the date of completion." 45 C.F.R. § 74.110
(1976). This regulation has since been revised in such a way as to make a finding of termination in
a situation like Southern Mutual much less likely.
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established "for the purpose of reviewing and providing hearings upon
post-award disputes,"'' 43 had jurisdiction over SMHA's challenge of its
grant termination. 44 Accordingly, the court held that HEW's own
regulation required that it provide SMHA with a hearing. The court
vacated judgment and remanded the case with instructions that a for-
mal hearing be held before the Grant Appeals Board. This was to pro-
vide SMHA with an opportunity to rebut the allegations against it. If
SMHA could rebut the allegations, they were to be stricken from the
record to the extent that they were without basis.' 45 Because the court
was able to dispose of the case on narrow regulatory grounds, it de-
clined to consider the plaintiff's due process constitutional claim. 146
In a dissent, Judge Wilkey-expressed disagreement with the court on
both the standing issue147 and the merits.' 48 The essence of Wilkey's
argument concerned the HEW regulations. He maintained that it was
appropriate to defer to HEW's interpretation of its own regulations
rather than to apply the doctrine of contraproferentem. The two rea-
sons advanced in favor of deference to the departmental construction
were that it was reasonable and that it was consistent with congres-
sional intent in enacting the Migrant Health Act that migratory work-
ers rather than health care delivery agencies be benefited. 149 Another
concern articulated by Judge Wilkey was that providing broad proce-
dural protections to grantees such as SMHA might entrench a private
bureaucracy "beyond effective government control" and thus "perhaps
superordinate the interests of the grantees over those of the
beneficiaries." 50
In Southern Mutual, the grantee was able to secure due process pro-
tections by demonstrating that it had a legitimate claim of entitlement
to grant benefits. The ability to make this showing, however, rested not
on anything intrinsic to the nature of grants, but rather on an award
document that bestowed a present vested interest in continued receipt
of grant benefits until June 30, 1976. Moreover, SMHA was forced to
rely on regulations defining adverse action of the type taken against it
143. 45 C.F.R. § 16.1 (1980).
144. 574 F.2d at 525, 528.
145. Id. at 528.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 528-32 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 532-34 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 533 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 534 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
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as a termination. This case therefore demonstrated that a federal gran-
tor, by the simple expedient of a narrow revision of its regulations,
could obviate the necessity of providing due process. 15' In order to
guarantee that a grantee's procedural rights cannot be legislated or reg-
ulated away, it is necessary to establish that these rights are constitu-
tionally protected interests.
B. Due Process on the Basis of a Property Interest
One of the bases upon which a grantee may claim the guarantee of
procedural due process is that the grantee possesses a protected prop-
erty interest. Property represents a relationship between wealth and
owner.' 52 Traditionally, a person obtained the item of wealth in the
form of a tangible good and gained certain legal rights with respect to
that item. Among these was the constitutional right not to be deprived
of that item of wealth without due process of law. In the seminal case
of Goldberg v. Kelly, however, the Supreme Court adopted the concept
of entitlements, the more important of which are statutory entitlements
that flow from government.' 53 The Court held that a termination of
welfare benefits, absent an opportunity for a prior evidentiary hearing,
was a denial of procedural due process in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. 154 Although the Court did not precisely limit the defini-
tion of constitutionally protected property interests under the label of
entitlement, the Court in subsequent cases made it clear that a recipi-
ent's expectation of the continued receipt of a benefit may qualify as a
legitimate claim of entitlement if this expectation is based on an objec-
tive source such as a statute, rule, or policy. 55 The government in
some manner must have indicated that the recipient could rely on the
continuation of the benefit absent some cause for termination and that
the recipient must now in fact rely on continued receipt in his daily life.
151. This type of revision has already been made. See note 140 supra and the regulations
cited therein.
152. The proposition that property represents a relation between a thing and its owner has
been recognized numerous times in dicta. See, e.g., Button v. Drake, 302 Ky. 517, 522, 195
S.W.2d 66, 69 (1946); In re Marriage of Breen, 560 S.W.2d 358, 363 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Senior v.
Braden, 128 Ohio St. 597, 608, 193 N.E. 614, 618 (1934). See also Reich, supra note 60, at 739.
153. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970). The entitlement that the government dis-
penses usually take the form of rights or status. See Reich, supra note 60.
154. 397 U.S. at 263.
155. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972).
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Thus, termination of an entitlement to government benefits "adjudi-
cates important rights."' 5 6 By conferring an entitlement on a recipient,
the government is obliged to provide benefits to which the recipient is
entitled as of right. "The concept of equal treatment also inheres in
entitlement and argues against basing eligibility on special statutes
.. .. ,57 Recent case law confirms that individuals in whom statutory
entitlements are vested cannot be deprived of their government benefits
without due process of law.15 8 The same safeguards have been held to
156. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J.
1245, 1256 (1965).
157. Id.
158. See note 38 supra and cases cited therein. Two major schools of interpretation have
emerged from the line of cases exemplified by Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). One view
is that the due process clause will serve as a general prohibition against government arbitrariness,
requiring fair procedures whenever the state acts to the detriment of an individual. A second
interpretation regards these cases as deciding a very narrow constitutional issue. See notes 120-22
supra and accompanying text. The first view was apparently rejected in Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972). There the Court noted that although there were no "rigid or formalistic
limitations on the protection of procedural due process," it was still necessary to observe "certain
boundaries." 408 U.S. at 572. These "boundaries," of course, are the outer limits of the terms
"liberty" and "property." Regardless of which view is the correct one, it is clear that Goldberg and
its progeny have advanced the boundaries of "property" to include those government benefits in
which persons have a statutory entitlement. This should ensure that no one is arbitrarily deprived
of a benefit to which the government has said he is entitled. Note, however, that the fact that
property interests are created by independent sources other than the Constitution, 408 U.S. at 577,
does not make due process protections contingent on whether the interest asserted is considered an
entitlement as defined by federal, state, or local governments. Allowing government entities to
decide this question would defeat the guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments by al-
lowing government to decide when due process protections apply. But see Justice Rehnquist's
plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Justice Rehnquist, writing for him-
self and two other justices, determined that a nonprobationary federal employee did have a prop-
erty interest in a position from which the statute provided he could not be removed other than for
"such cause as will promote the efficiency of [the] service." 416 U.S. at 151-52. However, Justice
Rehnquist also decided that the procedure to which the employee was entitled for the determina-
tion of "cause" was subject to whatever limitations Congress had imposed in the section that
conferred the property interest. The entitlement conferred by statute was "not a guarantee against
removal without cause in the abstract, but such a guarantee as enforced by the procedure which
Congress has designated for the determination of cause." 416 U.S. at 152. Six justices indicated
their disagreement with this view that the government, in creating a statutory right, could simulta-
neously limit the procedural protections which attend it. As Justice Powell wrote in an opinion
concurring with the result:
While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in federal employment, it
may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred,
without appropriate procedural safeguards. As our cases have consistently recognized,
the adequacy of statutory procedures for deprivation of a statutorily created property
interest must be analyzed in constitutional terms.
416 U.S. at 167 (Powell, J., concurring). Regarding the development of Justice Powell's views on
this subject, see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 586-87 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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apply where statutory entitlements in government benefits have been
conferred on institutions.159
Federal grant-type assistance is plainly wealth, but is it property? Is
there that relationship between the wealth and the grantee? Absolute
ownership of property has never been a prerequisite for due process
protections to come into play, and there is no doubt that the grantee
does not have complete ownership of the grant funds. Fortunately for
grantees, however, ownership of grant funds is not the deciding factor
in determining whether there is a property interest in a particular grant.
Rather, the key question is the nature of the grantee's relationship to
the grant, the item of wealth. The answer determines whether a pro-
tected property interest exists. For many grantees, the status that is
159. In an action by grantees to review a decision denying the application to refund a project
under E.O.A., it was held that the grantees were not intended to have a continuing property inter-
est in funds and equipment, and in absence of an informal agreement or an intention to chill
constitutional freedoms, grantees were not entitled to due process procedures on denial of fund-
ing. The denial was not considered a termination of the grant. Mil-Ka-Ko Research & Dev.
Corp. v. Office of Economic Opportunity, 352 F. Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1972), affd metrz 497 F.2d
684 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
A state statute prohibited the revocation, suspension, limitation, or annulment of a nursing
home's certificate of operation without a hearing. Nursing homes are entitled to a hearing before
the termination of their participation in the Medicaid program when the state agency's refusal to
waive fire codes would operate as an effective limitation on the operating certificate of the nursing
home. Maxwell v. Wyman, 458 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1972).
A nursing home operator who received Medicaid payments on behalf of the nursing home
residents was held to have a property right in her expectation of continued receipt of Medicaid
payments as long as the home complied with state and federal requirements. Such property could
not be taken without due process of law, which requires, at a minimum, notice and a hearing.
Hathaway v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1976).
A recipient such as a grantee was entitled to certain forms of notice and opportunities to be
heard in connection with suspension or termination hearings concerning its grant. Such recipients
had ascertainable and identifiable interests in the grant and the right to demand that O.E.O. com-
ply with its published regulations. Red School House, Inc. v. Office of Economic Opportunity,
386 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Minn. 1974).
When plaintiff was no longer to be funded as an independent organization but would be merged
with legal services organization in another county, it was held that this did not involve an interest
that comes under the protection of the due process clause for a full and fair hearing. The decision,
although constituting the merger as a denial of refunding rather than termination, held that due
process still required reasonable notice and an opportunity to show cause. Monmouth Legal
Servs. Organization v. Carlucci, 330 F. Supp. 985 (D.N.J. 1971).
There is a right of notice and a pretermination hearing prior to cut-off of Medicaid payments
when the state manual provides for such notice and hearings in the event the state intends to
terminate a provider for reasons other than violation of federal law. Briarcliff Haven, Inc. v.
Department of Human Resources, 403 F. Supp. 1355 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
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conferred by the very fact that the government has chosen to award a
grant constitutes a property interest.
Status may be the main source of subsistence for a person.' 60 The
benefits the federal government dispenses, in large part, take the form
of status.' 6' The argument that a person has no constitutional right to
be a grantee ignores the real issue. The problem is not whether a per-
son has a right to a particular status, but whether once a person ac-
quires such status through government action he should be provided
with certain safeguards before he is deprived of that status by govern-
ment action.' 62 As indicated, the consequences of deprivation may be
160. See Reich, supra note 60, at 738. Recognition that status could be the main source of
someone's subsistence was shown by the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). The decision in that case was motivated in part by an appreciation of the possible conse-
quences of a summary termination of the Goldberg plaintiffs' status as Aid to Families of Depen-
dent Children recipients. 397 U.S. at 264.
161. See Reich, supra note 60, at 739.
162. See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). In Greene, the Court was confronted
with the interest of an aeronautical engineer in a government security clearance allowing him
access to classified defense materials. Greene's employer, a firm principally engaged in work on
defense contracts, was required by the terms of its contracts with the military to exclude from its
projects any employee denied or deprived of a security clearance by defense department officials.
In accordance with procedures devised by the Secretary of Defense and the individual Armed
Services, it was concluded that Greene's "'continued access to Navy classified security informa-
tion [was] inconsistent with the best interests of National Security.'" Id. at 481. His security
clearance was therefore revoked. The contractual necessity to exclude from defense projects em-
ployees without clearance resulted in Greene's dismissal. Greene was unable thereafter to secure
a new position in aeronautical engineering, and was finally reduced to accepting employment at
less than one quarter of his previous salary. Although Greene was afforded a hearing at which to
challenge the deprivation of his status as "loyal," at no time did he have an opportunity to con-
front or cross-examine government informants who furnished information against him. Indeed, it
was apparent from the record that officials who conducted the hearing and made the decision
adverse to Greene had never personally examined these informants, but had relied instead on an
investigator's summary report of what the informants had said.
The Court readily agreed that revocation of Greene's government conferred security clearance
had affected fifth amendment "liberty" and "property" by impinging on "the right to hold specific
private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental in-
terference." Id. at 492. The necessity for a constitutional decision as to whether the procedures
afforded Greene denied him due process was avoided when the Court held that, absent an explicit
authorization by Congress or the President, the procedures employed in Greene's case were insuf-
ficient to revoke a security clearance. Id. at 507-08. Had the Court found explicit authorization, it
would have been required, of course, to determine whether the defense department's procedures
passed constitutional muster. Dictum that the opportunity to confront and cross-examine accusers
was among "[c]ertain principles [that] have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence,"
Id. at 496, strongly implies these procedures would have been disapproved. Greene is therefore
significant because it suggests that status to which an individual obviously has no abstract right,
namely a security clearance, once conferred assumes the attributes-of a government entitlement.
Similarly, in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), it was held that status as public school pupils, to
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very grave. When, for example, a grant is terminated or re-funding is
refused, the result is the same regardless of the terminology: the liveli-
hood of the grantee's employees may be jeopardized, and the very
existence of the grantee itself and its programmatic mission may be
endangered. 163
If the grantee has more than a mere unilateral expectation of its con-
tinued status as a grantee, and if there are rules and mutual under-
standings as to a continued status, then the grantee deserves the rights
and safeguards that are connected with an entitlement. The govern-
ment does recognize that the grantee has certain rights and has there-
fore established certain guidelines for hearings concerning grant
termination." 4 The denial of a grantee's application 165 or a failure to
which there is no constitutional right, id. at 572, once it has been advanced by the state, cannot be
revoked or even suspended "absent fundamentally fair procedures." Id. at 574. Appellees in Goss
were public high school students who had received ten day suspensions from school for their
alleged misconduct. No opportunity to challenge the suspensions at a hearing was afforded. Ap-
pellees therefore alleged a denial of pr9cedural due process guaranteed them by the fourteenth
amendment.
Admitting there was no constitutional right to a public school education, the Supreme Court
nonetheless held that Ohio statutes directing local officials to provide free education to resident
children and providing for compulsory attendance vested in appellees "legitimate claims of enti-
tlement." Id. at 573. Although the Court was willing to concede that a ten day suspension was a
mild deprivation in relative terms, it rejected the appellants' view that it was de minimus. Id. at
576.
The temporary deprivation of student status faced by the Goss appellees was not held to require
all traditional safeguards such as the right to counsel or to confront and cross-examine witnesses.
Id. at 583. Students were, however, to be informed of the misconduct with which they were
accused and to be given an opportunity to be heard in their own defense, either before or soon
after the suspension. Id. at 581-83. The decision in Goss indicates the recipient of government
conferred status has received an interest of constitutional dimensions. It also indicates an unwill-
ingness to accept the premises underlying the plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1973). See note 155 supra.
163. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
164. OMB Circular A-1 10, supra note 58, § 3, Attachment L "Suspensions and Termination
Procedures." This sets out three alternatives for grantors who wish to suspend or terminate a
grant:
1. After reasonable notice, a grantor may suspend a grant for cause, that is, because of
a grantee's failure to comply with the terms of the grant or other agreement, condi-
tions or standards.
2. If a grantor determines a recipient has failed to comply with its requirement, the
grantor may terminate a grant for cause by sending a notice. The letter must set out
the reasons for the termination.
3. There may be a termination made by mutual agreement of grantor and grantee,
labeled as a termination convenience.
Id. These provisions give the grantee more than unilateral expectation of continued funding, an
interest that should be protected by at least the minimal safeguards required by due process. See
also note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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renew his grant, that is, the failure to re-fund, directly involves the
165. Logic suggests that a grantee with a present vested interest in a grant will be more likely
to have success in pressing due process claims than will a disappointed grant applicant. See note
16 .supra. The rights of applicants for government benefits are held more tenuously than those of
persons in whom such benefits are vested. The decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970),
protected the due process rights of welfare recipients facing a termination of AFDC. At issue was
"the withdrawal of public assistance benefits," id. at 262, and not the decision of whether to ad-
vance the benefits. In the grant context, a federal circuit court of appeals has refused to hold that
disappointed applicants have standing to challenge federal grant decisions. The court distin-
guished the level of damage resulting from the interruption of an existing grant relationship as
compared to the harm worked by the denial of a grant application. Southern Mut. Help Ass'n v.
Califano, 574 F.2d 518, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Recently, however, a precedent has been established for affording due process rights to ag-
grieved applicants for government benefits. This precedent, if followed, may presage a major
expansion of the scope of statutory entitlements and could have significant implications in the
grant field. The case, which held that California laws had created legitimate claims of entitlement
in applicants for General Relief Program benefits, is Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118 (9th Cir.
1979), cer. denied sub nom, Peer v. Griffeth, 445 U.S. 970 (1980).
Grig7elh was a class action suit on behalf of persons whose applications for General Relief (GR)
benefits had been or would in the future be denied by the San Diego County Department of
Welfare. Brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), the plaintiffs' suit challenged the constitutional
adequacy of county procedures for reviewing GR applications. The plaintiffs appealed the grant
by a federal district court of summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that an appli-
cant had neither a property interest nor a legitimate claim of entitlement to the benefits desired.
Griffeth v. Detrich, 448 F. Supp. 1137, 1141 (S.D. Cal. 1978).
California statutes required that each county in the state provide relief for all incompetent,
incapacitated, poor, and indigent persons who were legal residents within the county and who
were without alternative means of support. It was also provided by statute that each county's
board of supervisors, or an authorized agency, adopt regulations by which to administer the Gen-
eral Relief Program. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 17000-17001 (Deering 1979). The circuit
court ruled that these statutes, and regulations promulgated under their authority, "define[d] the
eligibility conditions for obtaining benefits" under the GR program. 603 F.2d at 120. Each
county was able to exercise discretion in setting eligibility standards as long as these were consis-
tent with the statute and "'reasonably necessary to effectuate its purpose."' Id. (citing Mooney v.
Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 679, 483 P.2d 1231, 1237, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279, 285 (1971)). In San Diego
County, the board of supervisors adopted basic policies, and a Department of Public Welfare was
empowered to issue implementing regulations, which it then administered. A program guide in-
corporating the regulations set forth criteria and procedures for establishing GR eligibility.
The plaintiffs' representative party applied to the Department for general relief on August 18,
1976. She had been fired from her waitress job for alleged improper dress, although she denied
this impropriety at her screening interview. Plaintiffs application was, nevertheless, denied be-
cause "she was 'apparently fired for cause."' Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d at 120. At a requested
administrative review, a supervisor reviewed plaintiffs file and a single attempt to reach her for-
mer employer was unsuccessful. The application was again denied.
In federal court, the plaintiff and others in her position argued that San Diego County, in pro-
viding administrative review for the denial of GR applications, had failed to satisfy the require-
ments of procedural due process. They asserted that their interest in general relief benefits were
protected by the fourteenth amendment.
The circuit court, in considering the plaintiffs' claim, examined the interest asserted "to deter-
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grantee with the government, subject to the rules the latter has estab-
mine whether applicants for general relief have a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' to such bene-
fits." Id. Finding that plaintiffs had such a claim, the court relied primarily on the Supreme
Court's decision in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). Greenholz involved
a challenge to the constitutional adequacy of the procedures by which the Nebraska Board of
Parole made discretionary parole release determinations. In a narrow decision the court rejected
the assertion by plaintiff inmates that a state, by merely holding out the possibility of parole,
conferred an interest of constitutional dimensions. Some merit was found, however, in an alterna-
tive argument that "the Nebraska statutory language itself create[d] a protectable expectation of
parole," and the Court held that "the expectancy of relief provided in this state is entitled to some
measure of constitutional protection." Id. at 11-12.
The holding in Greenholz followed from an analysis of the statutory language that defined the
asserted interest. The circuit court's own statutory analysis in Grffieh revealed that "[iere the
authorizing statute also uses mandatory language." 603 F.2d at 121. California had required each
county to provide general relief. Moreover, San Diego County had adopted by regulation "spe-
cific objective eligibility criteria for the receipt of aid" that significantly restricted the discretion
intake eligibility workers were able to exercise. Id. Indeed, the county's GR program guide
provided that "[i]f there is a stated policy, procedure or regulation a judgmental decision is neither
required nor permitted." Id. (emphasis in original). Therefore, based on its analysis of California
law, the circuit court held that "[t]he authorizing statute coupled with the implementing regula-
tions of the county creates a legitimate claim of entitlement and expectancy of benefits in persons
who claim to meet the eligibility requirements." Id. In deciding the case, the circuit court was
unwilling to be persuaded by Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County, 28 Cal. App. 3d 930, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 121 (1972), a state court case on which the district court had relied. The flaw in Zobriscky
was the state court's focus, in deciding the right to a due process hearing, on the applicant-recipi-
ent distinction rather than on whether "the applicants have a legitimate expectation of receiving
benefits." 603 F.2d at 1122.
In the Supreme Court, Justice Rehnquist dissented from a denial of a petition for certiorari.
Peer v. Griffeth, 445 U.S. 970, 970 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist regarded
the circuit court decision in Griffeth as "a significant step. . . to expand the ruling of this Court in
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)," which he believed warranted "plenary consideration" by
the Court. 445 U.S. at 970 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent, citing Zobriscky v. Los Ange-
les County, 28 Cal. App. 3d 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1972), noted the California courts' unwilling-
ness to extend hearing rights to disappointed general relief applicants because of their refusal to
deem general relief a protected property interest. 445 U.S. at 970 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Rehnquist conceded that "[o]bviously this Court cannot parse every state-law provision to
determine whether it creates a protected 'property interest,'" but thought the extent of the
Goldberg expansion warranted Supreme Court review in this case. 445 U.S. at 970-71 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). Quoting the district court decision in Groeth, the Justice highlighted the difference
between the right to a pretermination hearing for an AFDC recipient of the type Goldberg man-
dated and a similar hearing right for a disappointed general relief applicant. Id. at 971 (citing
Griffeth v. Detrich, 448 F. Supp. 1137, 1139 (S.D. Cal. 1978)) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
No other Justice joined Justice Rehnquist in his dissent to the denial of certiorari. Moreover, it
is common that a dissenter will state in very broad terms the significance of the case that has
allegedly been decided erroneously. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for attaching some
weight to Justice Rehnquist's opinion as to the importance of Griffieth v. Detrich. In the first place,
the distinction between Goldberg and Griffeth does seem clear enough to preclude describing the
latter as a natural extension of the former. Second, Justice Rehnquist is likely to be sensitive to
any extension of Goldberg because, during his tenure on the Court, he has consistently shown
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fished. This situation is similar to one in which state action interferes
with an individual's right to engage in an occupation or profession, a
right viewed as sufficiently substantial to require that the government
afford due process protections.166
One can draw an analogy to the award of government contracts, in
which the courts have held that bidders have an entitlement to due
process and that a public officer may not operate arbitrarily with regard
to a bid.' 67  "The [agency] has the right to be wrong, dead wrong, but
not unfairly, arbitrarily wrong."' 6  The right to a fair consideration of
an application for a grant or renewal may be insufficient to compel a
hearing. When coupled with the ease of abuse of unchecked adminis-
trative discretion and the difficulties in remedying such abuse, however,
the argument for- a right to procedural safeguards is strengthened
greatly.169
hostility to the expansion of procedural due process. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976);
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1973).
For recent cases discussing the principles at issue in Grhfeth, see Jacobson v. Hannifin, 627 F.2d
177 (9th Cir. 1980) (Nevada Gaming Control Act does not contain mandatory language such as
will provide the applicant for licensing as a casino landlord an expectation of entitlement rising to
the level of a property interest); Baker v. Cincinnati Metropolitan Hous. Auth., 490 F. Supp. 520
(S.D. Ohio 1980) (housing authority could not refuse applications for rental assistance under the
Community and Urban Development Act of 1974 from persons currently residing in housing
authority's conventional housing).
166. "[T]he right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession free
from unreasonable governmental interference comes within the 'liberty' and 'property' concepts of
the Fifth Amendment." Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959). Accord, Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (due process clause cannot be contravened when a state
excludes a person from the practice of law); Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117
(1926) (a certified public accountant within the class of those entitled to be admitted to practice
before the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals may not be denied admission absent fair procedures). See
also Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (a state must provide
procedural due process before it can exclude a person from the practice of law).
167. See Note, supra note 26, at 159.
168. Housing Auth. v. Pittman Constr. Co., 264 F.2d 695, 703 (5th Cir. 1959) (board of city
housing authority abused its discretion by deciding a low bidder is an irresponsible bidder without
giving the low bidder an opportunity to disprove charges of irresponsibility).
169. "The grant, denial, revocation, and administration of all types of government largess
should be subject to scrupulous observance of fair procedures." Reich, supra note 60, at 783.
"The great purpose of the requirement [of due process] is to exclude everything that is arbitrary
and capricious in legislation [or agency action] affecting the right of the citizen." Dent v. West
Virginia, 127 U.S. 114, 124 (1889). "Where administrative action has raised serious constitutional
problems, the Court has assumed that Congress or the President intended to afford those affected
by the action the traditional safeguards of due process." Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507
(1959).
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C. Due Process on the Basis of a Liberty Interest
If the interest at stake is determined not to constitute a property in-
terest within the meaning of the fifth amendment, it is necessary to de-
termine whether it constitutes a liberty interest such as will trigger due
process safeguards. In this context, "liberty" refers to more than a per-
sons's interest in freedom from bodily restraint. The Supreme Court
has widened the scope of protected liberty interests well beyond mere
corporeal movement.7 0 Although traditionally perceived as protecting
the accused in criminal proceedings, a liberty interest in due process
has been thought to attach whenever "grievous loss of any kind" has
been threatened whether or not the "stigma and hardships of a criminal
conviction" will ensue. 7'
In Wisconsin v. Constantineau,72 the Supreme Court explicitly recog-
nized that a liberty interest in due process could be present even when
proposed government action entailed no criminal penalties, but rather
merely reputational stigma. In this case the Court held, per Justice
Douglas, that "[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or in-
tegrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, no-
tice and an opportunity to be heard are essential."'' 7 3
The Constantineau principle was limited significantly in Paul v. Da-
vis. 174 In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that "reputa-
tion alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as
employment, is Inleither 'liberty' [n]or 'property' by itself sufficient to
invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause."' 7 5 Thus
an assertion that government action has injured a reputational liberty
interest cannot by itself, under the strict rule of Paul v. Davis,176 sustain
a successful claim to procedural due process. The Davis Court re-
quired instead that the due process claimant show harm to "reputation
plus"; that is, to "some more tangible interest" as well. 177 Note, how-
ever, that the "plus" part of this requirement need not involve injury to
170. R. CAPPALLI, supra note 7, at 212.
171. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
172. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
173. Id. at 437.
174. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
175. Id. at 701.
176. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
177. Id. at 701.
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another constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. 78 Ac-
cordingly, federal courts have found liberty interests implicated when
claimants have alleged an injury to reputation in conjunction with an
injury to another protected interest--even if that interest does not as-
sume constitutional dimensions.
For example, in Colaizzi v. Walker,179 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered whether an action alleging
the deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest could be
maintained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs in Colaizzi had been em-
ployees of the Illinois Department of Labor. The defendants, the gov-
ernor of the state and other officials, had discharged the plaintiffs on
the basis of investigatory findings that plaintiffs had abused their offi-
cial positions by attempting to force a company they supervised to drop
criminal proceedings against a former employee. At the same time
plaintiffs' cause of action was dismissed, the defendants allegedly is-
sued press releases detailing the misconduct and abuse for which plain-
tiffs allegedly were responsible. The complaint stated that the plaintiffs
had not been afforded notice or a hearing. The circuit court saw the
issue as "whether Governor Walker's published allegations under the
circumstances of this case deprived plaintiffs of a liberty interest with-
out due process."' Citing Constantineau,'8 ' the circuit court found
that the charges contained in the press releases had indeed impugned
the plaintiffs' reputations and good names. Although acknowledging
that under Davis, an injury to reputation alone was not itself a depriva-
tion of liberty,'8I the court distinguished Davis on its facts, pointing out
that Davis had not suffered any job loss. In Colaizzi, however, the
plaintiffs had suffered job loss, and the circuit court therefore held that
"infliction of a stigma to reputation accompanied by a failure to rehire
(or afortiori, by a discharge) states a claim for deprivation of liberty
without due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 8 3
178. See, e.g., Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499, 513 n. 17 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 913 (1981); Colaizzi v. Walker, 542 F.2d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
960 (1977).
179. 542 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1976).
180. Id. at 972.
181. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
182. 542 F.2d at 973.
183. Id. In distinguishing Davi, the circuit court focused on that case's treatment of language
in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), in which the Roth Court refused to find a
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Citing Colaizzi approvingly, the Fifth Circuit, in Marrero v. City of
Hialeah,"8 4 found that a liberty interest is implicated by an injury to
reputation plus injury to a tangible interest other than employment.
The plaintiffs in that case, owners and operators of a jewelry store in
Hialeah, Florida, appealed the lower court decision dismissing their 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to state a claim. The plaintiffs alleged
that police officers of the defendant city, along with an assistant state's
attorney, had entered and searched their store pursuant to a warrant
authorizing a search for stolen jewelry. This search uncovered no item
listed in the warrant, but one of several victims of local robberies
brought in to identify stolen goods identified a single item as stolen.
Plaintiffs thereupon were arrested and nearly their entire stock of jew-
elry seized. It was further alleged that representatives of local televi-
sion stations arrived at plaintiffs' store simultaneously with the police
and the prosecutor, who then announced the plaintiffs' arrest and the
recovery of $75,000 in stolen property. The police were also alleged to
have issued to local print and broadcast media an announcement that
stolen property had been recovered from the plaintiffs' store and was
available for identification. Although plaintiffs were charged with re-
ceipt of stolen property, all jewelry seized was returned to them after a
state court judge granted their motion to suppress the evidence. As of
the date of their filing in district court, no further action on state
charges against the plaintiffs had been taken. Their complaint alleged
an illegal search and seizure in violation of their fourth amendment
rights, plus slander of their business and personal reputations in viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment. Plaintiffs alleged that these actions
destroyed their business and personal reputations and deprived them of
their right to earn a living.
Among the issues addressed on appeal was whether the plaintiffs'
deprivation of reputational liberty, because "It]he State, in declining to rehire [Roth], did not
make any charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his
community." Id. at 573. Seizing on this linkage of stigma and job loss, the Dayis Court
concluded:
While Roth recognized that governmental action defaming an individual in the course of
declining to rehire him could entitle the person to notice and an opportunity to be heard
as to the defamation, its language is quite inconsistent with any notion that a defamation
perpetrated by a government official but unconnected with any refusal to rehire would
be actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 709. In other wordsjob loss accompanied with government infliction of
injury to reputation is a deprivation of liberty that requires due process protections.
184. 625 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913 (1981).
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allegation of injury to reputation was sufficient to state a cause of ac-
tion under section 1983 or whether it was insufficient to do so because,
as defendant-appellees argued, such an injury did not amount to a con-
stitutionally protected liberty interest. The circuit court noted that Paul
v. Davis was "of seminal importance"1 85 but nevertheless decided that
Davis could be limited and distinguished:
Paul simply holds that no liberty or property interest is infringed when
the only loss suffered at the hands of the government is damage to per-
sonal reputation if personal reputation is not recognized by the relevant
state law as a liberty or property interest. The holding of Paul does not
require the dismissal of appellants' claim of injury to their personal and
business reputations because, on at least four independent grounds, ap-
pellants' claims, unlike those in Paul, do involve deprivations of constitu-
tionally protected interests.18 6
In specifying the independent grounds on which the plaintiffs' claims
involved protected interests, the circuit court cited two distinct theories,
both of which involved reputation plus "some more tangible inter-
ests": 8 7 injury to reputation "plus" loss of good will, and injury to
reputation "plus" violation of fourth amendment rights.' 8 The for-
mer, reputation plus loss of good will, refers not only to injury to a
personal and/or business reputation,8 9 which was the kind of abstract
harm the Davis Court found too insubstantial to implicate a constitu-
tional liberty interest, but rather to a more tangible interest in the good
will of an individual's business. In this context, business good will re-
fers to "the value inhering in the favorable consideration of customers
arising from a business' reputation as being well established and well
conducted."' 90 The circuit court, in reviewing state cases, found that
this interest in good will is a protected property interest under Florida
law, of which Florida may not deprive anyone without due process. '9'
Here, by falsely stating over television that nearly the entire inventory
185. Id. at 512.
186. Id. at 513 (emphasis added). See note 175 supra and accompanying text for a discussion
of whether the "plus" part of "reputation plus" must itself be a constitutionally protected interest.
187. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
188. 625 F.2d at 515-19.
189. Regarding "business reputation" and the extent of its tangibility, see generalo id. at 516
n.22.
190. Id. at 515.
191. Id. at 514-15. See aLo NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc., 152 So. 2d 179, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963), vacated as moot, 376 U.S. 190 (1964); Paramount Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchell, 104
Fla. 407, 417, 140 So. 328, 332 (1932).
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of plaintiffs' store consisted of stolen merchandise, state and local offi-
cials implied that plaintiffs "dealt in stolen goods." The circuit court
therefore held that to the extent such statements "resulted in injury
both to appellants' personal and/or business reputations and to their
goodwill, the stigma-plus requirement of Davis has been satisfied." 192
The injury to reputation plus violation of fourth amendment rights
that the circuit court found in Marrero met the strict "stigma-plus" test
of Davis in a way that the facts alleged in the latter case could not.
Although the Supreme Court believed that Davis had "state[d] a classi-
cal claim for defamation," 193 that alleged defamation was deemed to
stand "alone and apart from any other governmental action with re-
spect to him."'194 In Marrero, on the other hand, allegations of defama-
tion did not stand alone. Rather, if taken as true, "the defamation was
intimately connected with the unlawful arrest of appellants and the un-
lawful search and seizure of practically the entire inventory of their
store."'195 Because the circuit court found that "the defamation alleged
here occurred in connection with the alleged violation of appellant's
fourth amendment rights,"' 96 it held the alleged injury to personal and
business reputations would, if proven, constitute the deprivation of lib-
erty interests. 197
Colaizzi and Marrero198 show that Paul v. Davis has not had the ef-
fect of completely shutting off all claims asserting deprivations of "lib-
erty" interests by government action that affects reputation. Grantees
who seek due process protections when confronted with the adverse
actions of federal grantors may take some encouragement from that
192. 625 F.2d at 516.
193. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 697.
194. Id. at 694.
195. 625 F.2d at 517.
196. Id. at 519. The fourth amendment to the Constitution prohibits the federal government
from undertaking "unreasonable searches and seizures" of "persons, houses, papers and effects,"
U.S. CONST. amend. IV, and has been made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.
197. 625 F.2d at 519. In order to reach this result, the court found it necessary to consider
whether Davis required that defamatory statements be held to implicate liberty interests only
when they cause injury to an interest more tangible than reputation, or whether a liberty interest
could be found when defamation was merely connected to the injury of a more tangible interest.
Id. at 517-19. The court determined that "it is sufficient that the defamation occur in connection
with, and be reasonably related to, the alternation of the right or interest." Id. at 519.
198. See also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Larry v. Lawler, 605 F.2d
954 (7th Cir. 1978); Dennis v. S. & S. Consol. Rural High School Dist., 577 F.2d 338 (5th Cir.
1978).
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fact. That adverse grantor actions work deprivations of grantee liberty
interests even under Davis is certainly an arguable proposition, be-
cause, as indicated,1 99 such actions "can have disastrous conse-
quences. ' '200 First, there is a "stigma," because these adverse actions
are most often predicated on findings of grantee misconduct.20 1 Fol-
lowing the stigma, there is the "plus": injury to more tangible interests,
be they denial of the future opportunity to receive grant funds,202 im-
possibility of fufilling the grantee "mission,"20 3 or even "the grantee
itself [having to] go out of business.' 2°
Finally, a recent case, Old Dominion Dairy Products, Inc. v. Secretary
of Defense ,205 significantly enhances the likelihood that grantees can
secure due process protections for themselves by asserting the depriva-
tion by government action of a constitutional liberty interest. Although
a federal contractor rather than a grantee was the litigant, the analogy
between grants and contracts makes this an important case in the de-
velopment of federal grant law.206
The case 20 7 concerned the effects of Department of Defense (DOD)
decisions that a defense contractor lacked integrity and responsibil-
ity.2°8 Plaintiff-appellant, Old Dominion Dairy Products, Inc.,
(ODDPI), was a largely family-owned business that manufactured and
199. See notes 7-28 supra and accompanying text.
200. See Boasberg & Hewes, supra note 19, at 402.
201. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. In this context, note that the grantee may not
be heard to complain of the stigma attaching from an accurate finding of misconduct. Rather, the
grantee's argument is that, absent fundamentally fair procedures, there is an unacceptable risk
that such a stigma (and all the consequences that attend it) will follow an inaccurate finding of
misconduct.
202. See notes 122-48 supra and accompanying text.
203. See notes 7 & 19 supra and accompanying text.
204. Boasberg & Hewes, supra note 19, at 402.
205. 631 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Accord, Transco Security, Inc., v. Freeman, 639 F.2d 316,
321 (6th Cir. 1981) (relying on Old Dominion, government contractor may not be blacklisted with-
out being afforded due process procedural safeguards including notice of the charges, an opportu-
nity to rebut the allegations of impropriety, and if necessary, a hearing).
206. For arguments supporting the grant-contract analogy, see notes 72-92 supra and accom-
panying text. Regarding distinctions between grants and contracts, see notes 74-104 supra and
accompanying text. See generally Wallick & Montalto, supra note 16, at 165-68. These authors
accept the analogy principally because grants and contracts are both seen as involving enforceable
obligations, and they cite in particular United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940), and
McGee v. Mathis, 71 U.S. 143 (1866).
207. Old Dominion Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Secretary of Defense, 631 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
208. Id. at 956-57. The basis for this conclusion was a determination that ODDPI had tried
"to recoup undue monies under the contract." Although the factual issues of alleged misconduct
or lack of integrity were not resolved in judicial proceedings, there are indications that the dispute
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processed dairy products. Nearly all of its sales resulted from DOD-
awarded contracts to supply these products to overseas military
bases.2"9 Before the controversy that led to this litigation, DOD regu-
larly invited ODDPI to bid on military procurement contracts, and
DOD had never previously alleged or determined that ODDPI lacked
integrity or responsibility.
In February 1979, however, DOD conducted an audit of ODDPI's
home office. The report of the analyst who participated in the audit
noted three "irregularities" in ODDPI's performance on one of its
DOD contracts, that it was concluded, "show[ed] a lack of business
integrity."21 0 Almost simultaneously, ODDPI had been solicited and
was in the process of submitting a bid on a new DOD contract. Regu-
lations required that the contract officer make an award only to a con-
tractor determined to be "responsible." 21' Information provided to the
contract officer of results from the ODDPI audit led him to conclude
that ODDPI had not dealt "honestly" with the government. He there-
fore determined that ODDPI "lacked integrity" within the meaning of
DOD regulations and consequently was "not 'responsible.' ,,212 The
contract office, despite having had opportunities to do so, at no time
notified ODDPI that its responsibility or integrity was in question. The
office placed a written determination of nonresponsibility in ODDPI's
contract file, and on the following day, DOD awarded the contract to a
contractor whose bid exceeded that of ODDPI, the low bidder, by al-
most 1.4 million dollars.21 3
During that same winter of 1979, ODDPI had also been invited to
bid on another DOD contract. Once again, the contract officer re-
quested data on ODDPI's performance on its existing contracts, and on
the basis of the audit report and the determination that ODDPI lacked
integrity, the officer concluded that ODDPI was "a nonresponsible con-
tractor." Again ODDPI was never informed of the allegations against
it. The award thereafter was made to another contractor, notwith-
involved conflicting interpretations of complex and ambiguous contract language. Id. at 956-57 &
n.6.
209. Id. at 956.
210. 631 F.2d at 957. See Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) 1-904.1, 32 C.F.R. § 1-904.1
(1979).
211. 631 F.2d at 957. See Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) 1-903.1, 32 C.F.R. § 1-903.1
(1979).
212. 631 F.2d at 957.
213. Id. at 958-59.
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standing that ODDPI was the low bidder.2 14
After receiving notice that its bids had been turned down, ODDPI
sought a statement of reasons. It was informed only that the determi-
nation of nonresponsibility was based on the unsatisfactory record of
integrity. The DOD refused to re-award the contracts to ODDPI and
indicated that it could not remove the nonresponsibility determination
from the files.21 5 The circuit court later determined that "the record
here is clear that, but for the finding of a lack of integrity, Old Domin-
ion would otherwise have received the. . . contract[s]. The Govern-
ment has never suggested that any other reason motivated the award to
... a substantially higher bidder."2 6
Faced "with a total loss of its primary source of business," '217 ODDPI
filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging
that DOD contract officers had "no rational basis" for determining that
ODDPI lacked integrity and that in making such a determination with-
out affording notice or an opportunity to respond, the DOD had denied
ODDPI due process of law. The plaintiff sought declaratory and in-
junctive relief. Specifically, the company prayed for a declaration that
it did not lack integrity, and the cancellation of the previous contract
awards for re-award to ODDPI.21 8
The court dismissed ODDPI's complaint219 on the ground that
"[n]ecessarily... a contracting officer enjoys a very wide range of dis-
cretion," such that disappointed bidders challenging adverse action
must demonstrate "bad faith" or the "lack of any reasonable basis" for
the officers' decision.220 The plaintiff, however, presented "absolutely
no evidence" that would support such a showing. Moreover, the DOD
was deemed to have an "ample basis" for its actions, which were
"clearly reasonable under all the circumstances."'"
The court held that ODDPI's due process claim was "without
214. Id. at 958.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 959.
217. Id. On the same day an evidentiary hearing was to begin in district court, ODDPI was
notified of its formal suspension from bidding on DOD contracts in accordance with Defense
Acquisition Regulation (DAR) 1-605, 32 C.F.R. § 1-605 (1979). 631 F.2d at 959.
218. Old Dominion Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Brown, 471 F. Supp. 300 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd, 631
F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
219. 471 F. Supp. at 303.
220. Id. at 302.
221. Id. at 302-03. In this connection the court cited Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
576-78 (1972).
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merit."2" 2 It also determined that ODDPI's related claim of defacto
debarment from government contracting was "most certainly prema-
ture."2 3 For these reasons, the district court declined to afford ODDPI
any of its requested relief.
The plaintiff's cause fared much better in the circuit court. Although
the first argument raised on appeal, that it was error to find that the
DOD had a rational basis for determining ODDPI lacked integrity,
was summarily rejected,224 the circuit court gave more careful consider-
ation to the second argument: that it was error to hold plaintiff had no
due process right to notice and an opportunity to respond to charges
before denial of government contracts. The basis of ODDPI's due pro-
cess claim was not an alleged deprivation of a property interest but
rather deprivation of a liberty interest. In opposition to this claim, the
government offered three arguments.225 First, it argued that corpora-
tions do not possess liberty interests or rights of constitutional dimen-
sion that require due process protection. Second, even if there are such
rights, the government contended that no injury to a cognizable liberty
interest had been shown by ODDPI's allegations. Third, even if
ODDPI was entitled to due process, DOD suspension regulations pro-
vided adequate procedural protections. The circuit court considered
each of these arguments.
Respecting the first argument, that corporations do not possess lib-
erty interests within the meaning of the due process clause, the govern-
ment's position was held to be "without merit." '226 This determination
allowed ODDPI to pursue its due process claim notwithstanding the
absence of any property interest in the disputed contract awards.
Disposition of the government's first argument allowed the circuit
court to decide the central issue in the appeal: whether the actions of
222. 471 F. Supp. at 303.
223. Id. On appeal the circuit court, citing Keco Indus., Inc., v. United States, 492 F.2d 1200,
1203 (Ct. Cl. 1974), stated that the proper test for deciding the propriety of decisions by govern-
ment contract officers was "'whether the Government's conduct was arbitrary and capricious to-
ward the bidder-claimant."' It held that, given the lengthy hearings conducted below, there was
no justification for disturbing the district court's decision that there was a "reasonable basis" for
the contract officers' actions respecting ODDPI. Old Dominion Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Secretary of
Defense, 631 F.2d 953, 960 ( D.C. Cir. 1980).
224. 631 F.2d at 960.
225. Id. at 961. In support of its conclusion, the circuit court cited Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923), and Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936), for the lan-
guage that "a corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the. . . due process [clause]."
226. 631 F.2d at 963.
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the DOD injured a cognizable liberty interest of ODDPI. The court
recognized that the DOD's determination of nonresponsibility had
caused ODDPI to lose two contracts "which it would otherwise have
received." It also recognized that because the determination of nonre-
sponsibility would likely be reviewed by government contract officers
on all subsequent ODDPI contract bids, the DOD's action had "effec-
tively put Old Dominion out of business."227 Accepting the nub of
ODDPI's argument, that it had a right "to be free from 'stigmatizing'
governmental defamation having an immediate and tangible effect on
its ability to do business," the circuit court held that ODDPI's allega-
tions implicated a cognizable liberty interest.228
The court distinguished229 the Supreme Court's decision in Board of
Regents v. Roth because in that case the state university's refusal to
rehire a nontenured instructor was not coupled with "any charge
against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations
in his ommunity .... [flor example, that he had been guilty of dis-
honesty, or immorality."230 Moreover, as the circuit court noted, the
actions challenged in Roth had not imposed on the instructor any
"stigma or other disability" that would foreclose chances to take ad-
vantage of future opportunities. 23' ODDPI, however, had alleged facts
that, as the circuit court pointed out, the Supreme Court agreed would
make for "a different case. '232
The distinctions between Roth and Old Dominion were apparent pri-
marily in two respects. First, because of the conclusions of the DOD's
contract officers and audit report, there was "no doubt that Old Domin-
ion's good name and integrity were at stake, or that Old Dominion was
in effect charged with dishonesty. ' 233 Second, as to future opportuni-
ties, the DOD's determination that plaintiff was dishonest "effectively
foreclosed Old Dominion's freedom to take advantage of other Gov-
ernment employment opportunities, and barred ODDPI from all pub-
lic employment. '234 These distinctions caused the circuit court to hold
that the case, far from being controlled by the Roth holding, paralleled
227. Id. at 962-63.
228. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
229. 631 F.2d at 963 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 964.
234. Id.
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the situation outlined in Roth's dicta as requiring a different result.235
The Government, in support of its contention that no cognizable lib-
erty interest had been implicated in the case, argued that the alleged
injury was essentially one to ODDPI's reputation, which, under Paul Y.
Davis, did not assume constitutional proportions.236 The circuit court
found reliance on Davis "totally misplaced," believing instead that
cases distinguished in the Davis decision were more nearly on point.23 7
Because the court read the Davis Court's refusal to advance due process
protections to Davis as predicated on allegations of mere defamation
without more, it found that "it is clear. . . the opinion in Paul v. Davis
supports the [due process] claim of ODDPI in this case. '" 238
The Government's final argument was that even if a constitutional
liberty interest of ODDPI had been injured, the procedures afforded by
the DOD were sufficient to satisfy due process requirements. Since it
was not disputed that ODDPI had received no prior notice of the
charges against it before its contract bids were rejected, either during
the pendency of the nonresponsibility determination or afterward, the
government's position was that suspension proceedings initiated subse-
quently provided adequate procedural protections.239
It remained for the circuit court, having determined that ODDPI had
a right to due process, to decide what process was due. This decision
involved a balancing of the interest of a government contractor such as
the plaintiff, in its economic survival as a functioning business concern,
against the need of federal agencies "to be free to conduct Government
business effectively and efficiently." 2 ° The court was cognizant of the
"potentially crippling effect" of imposing too stringent procedural re-
235. Id. at 964-65. In this connection the circuit court cited United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.
303 (1946) (act of Congress directed at named government employees that prohibited future pay-
ments to them of any compensation such as to effectively bar them from any future government
employment served to stigmatize them and impair their chance to earn a living in an unconstitu-
tional manner). See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (discharge of an em-
ployee of a Navy contractor without hearing, for failure to meet naval installation security
requirements, did not violate due process requirements absent showing that stigma of disloyalty
would impair future employment opportunities); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123 (1951) (cited in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 703-05 (1976).
236. 631 F.2d at 966. Here again, the court made reference to the virtual debarment from
government contracting that resulted from the DOD's actions vis-A-vis ODDPI.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. .d.
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quirements.241 In striking the balance, the court held that where no
formal suspension or debarment has been initiated, the Government
must, as soon as is practicable, notify the contractor of "the specific
charges concerning the. . alleged lack of integrity" such that the con-
tractor may utilize any available opportunities to respond to and de-
fend against the specified charges "before adverse action is taken. '2 42
This minimum requirement-no obligation to provide a formal hear-
ing at this stage was imposed-was described as imposing "absolutely
no burden" on the government. Indeed, the court indicated that the
procedure it required could benefit and protect the interests of both
parties involved by allowing for the clarification of mistakes and mis-
understandings before the interests of either were injured.243
In this case, ODDPI had failed to receive the prior notice to which
the circuit court held it was entitled. The court was, however, appar-
ently at a loss as to what relief should be fashioned. It could find no
basis upon which to vacate the awards made on contracts ODDPI had
lost and to re-award them to the plaintiff. At the same time, the court
was ignorant of developments in the case subsequent to the district
court proceedings. Although it had held that the belated suspension
proceedings would not adequately safeguard the plaintiff, it recognized
that such proceedings might, so many months after the fact, be the only
available remedy. In light of the circumstances, the cause was re-
manded to the district court for further proceedings, with instructions
to structure a remedy that would allow ODDPI "to clear its name and
reestablish its integrity. '2 "44
D. Properqy and Liberty Interests in the Federal Grant Context
Consideration of whether any government action affects a property
or liberty interest requires that the conceptual distinction between the
two be kept clearly in mind. Injury sustained from a deprivation of
property is sustained because of the taking itself. A deprivation of
reputational liberty, on the other hand, involves harm to future oppor-
tunities.245 The latter concerns "not the debilitating present effects of
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id See also Conset Corp. v. Community Administration, 655 F.2d 1291, 1296-97 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
245. R. CAPPALLI, supra note 7, at 212.
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the property deprivation but the loss of future opportunities caused by
the badge of dishonor." 246
The importance of due process protections when a deprivation of a
reputational liberty interest is threatened may be very substantial in the
grant field. "A decision by the Federal Government to suspend, termi-
nate, or void a grant necessarily involves a tentative or final determina-
tion that the grantee organization has engaged in some misconduct
whether malfeasance or nonfeasance."24 7 The adverse consequences of
such a determination might very well attach not only to the personnel
of the grantee organization but to the "unworthy" grantee itself.
One adverse consequence resulting from a determination of grantee
noncompliance or misconduct is the effect of such a determination on
future opportunities to obtain federal grant funds. Courts have recog-
nized that the reputation a grantee acquires in performing on past
grants "is a key element in agency grant decisions, and an organization
that acquires a bad reputation in the grant community based on poor
performance will have a difficult burden to overcome in securing new
grants. '248 The very real possibility that such destructive results could
follow from federal actions taken unilaterally and without procedural
safeguards suggests a liberty deprivation even under the strict rule of
Paul v. Davis249 because the complaint of injury to reputation would be
accompanied by injury to more tangible interests as well.
While impact on future funding opportunities may be the most seri-
ous and direct consequence of federal action that damages a grantee's
reputation, other deleterious effects may also result. Most federal
grantees exist to perform a service for, or provide a benefit to, the com-
munity. One author calls this the grantee's "public service mission."250
A determination by a federal grantor of grantee misconduct or non-
compliance with grant conditions may, depending on the seriousness of
the violation and on the publicity that attends the grantor's action, dry
up sources of private funds, damage grantee standing in the local polit-
ical and business communities, affect the ability to retain and recruit
competent personnel, and weaken the support of the grantee's benefici-
246. Id.
247. R. CAPPALLI, supra note 7, at 214.
248. Southern Mut. Help Ass'n v. Califano, 574 F.2d 518, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1977). For further
discussion of Southern Mutual see notes 124-51 supra and accompanying text.
249. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). See notes 73-92 supra and accompanying text.
250. R. CAPPALLI, supra note 7, at 219.
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ary population. Should these things occur, the grantee's ability to fulfill
its "mission" may be destroyed.
V. WHAT PROCESS IS DUE TO THE FEDERAL GRANTEE?
Once it has been determined that government action has caused a
deprivation of a liberty or property interest, it is next necessary to de-
cide what procedural safeguards should apply.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that some kind of hear-
ing251 is required at some point before a person is permanently de-
prived of a property or liberty interest.252 To weigh properly the
requested procedure, it is necessary to identify the purposes a fair pro-
cedure is supposed to serve. One purpose is to protect persons against
arbitrary or erroneous deprivations of property or liberty once it is de-
termined that such interests are involved.253 A second purpose is to
foster the general feeling, important to a popular government, that jus-
tice has been done.254 The Court in Mathews v. Eldridge held that the
right to a pretermination hearing is inextricably bound to the
threatened deprivation of a person's livelihood or means of continued
existence.255 Moreover, it must be recognized that the variety of costs
imposed by requiring such a hearing procedure cannot be the sole basis
of a denial of various procedural protections.25 6 When a property or
liberty interest is involved, the person is guaranteed some minimal due
process protections, involving at least notice and an opportunity to be
heard. The exact nature of the procedure used will vary according to
the circumstances.
251. See generally Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
252. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See generally Catz & Robinson, Due Process and
Creditors' Remedies: From Sniadach and Fuentes to Mitchell, North Georgia and Beyond, 28
RUTGERS L. REV. 541 (1975).
253. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-84 (1975) (a parolee must be treated with basic
fairness in terminating his parole); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123
(1951).
254. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See notes 150-51 supra and accompanying text.
255. 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976).
256. Id. at 348. Since its decision in Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court has regularly resorted to
the test developed in that case. See, e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (Massachu-
setts statute mandating suspension of driver's license for refusal to take a breath-analysis test upon
arrest for driving under influence of intoxicating liquors does not violate requirement of procedu-
ral due process in failing to provide for a presuspension hearing); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
599-600 (1979) (state procedures for voluntary commitment of minor children to state mental
hospitals comport with procedural due process requirements by providing for a neutral, independ-
ent medical decision maker, and do not require a more formal judicial-type hearing).
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Mathews v. Eldridge, which outlines the prevailing test for making
this determination,257 involved the claim of a recipient of Social Secur-
ity disability payments. The state agency administering the federal
programs under which he received benefits had determined that the
recipient had ceased to be disabled. This determination was adopted
by the Social Security Administration, which notified the recipient that
his benefits would be terminated. Rather than pursuing his administra-
tive post-termination appeals remedies, the recipient filed an action in
United States District Court "challeng[ing] the constitutionality of the
procedures employed by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare to terminate disability benefits."25 The plaintiff sought an imme-
diate reinstatement of his benefits pending a disability hearing.
Relying largely on the Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v.
Kely, 259 both the district court and the court of appeals upheld the
plaintiffs due process claim.26° Because disability determinations may
involve "subjective judgments" based on conflicting evidence, the dis-
trict court held that prior to termination of his disability benefits, the
plaintiff was entitled to a Goldberg-type evidentiary hearing.26'
On certiorari review, the Supreme Court, after disposing of a thresh-
old jurisdictional question,262 declared that "[t]he dispute centers upon
what process is due prior to the initial termination of benefits, pending
review. "263 In assessing the requirements of due process generally, the
Court began with the "truism" that due process "is not a technical con-
ception with a fixed content unrelated to time [and] place, ' 264 but,
rather, it is "flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands."2 65 No single formulation of due process
safeguards could be appropriate to every case. Therefore a test by
which to identify the "specific dictates" of due process would require
consideration of three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; sec-
257. 424 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1976).
258. Eldridge v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Va. 1973), aft'd, 493 F.2d 1230 (4th Cir.
1974).
259. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
260. Eldridge v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1230 (4th Cir. 1974); Eldridge v. Weinberger, 361 F.
Supp. 520 (W.D. Va. 1973), af'd, 493 F.2d 1230 (4th Cir. 1974).
261. 361 F. Supp. at 528.
262. 424 U.S. 319, 326-32 (1976).
263. Id. at 333.
264. Id. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
265. Id. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
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ond, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the pro-
cedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.2 66
The Court's assessment of the three factors it had delineated in its
test for determining what process is due was complemented in Mathews
v. Eldridge by an assumption made by the Court as to the kinds of
procedures that are appropriate in different contexts. 267 The Court
quoted with approval Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion that the nature
of administrative agencies and administrative adjudication "preclude
wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial, and review
which have evolved from the history and experience of courts. 268
Therefore, ordering a judicial-style hearing was not "a required, nor
even the most effective method of decision-making in all circum-
stances. '' 269 All that was and is required for due process claimants is a
"meaningful opportunity to present their case." 270 The Court deter-
mined that for Mr. Eldridge, this did not mean a pretermination evi-
dentiary hearing.
In the grant context, however, the opposite is true. In order to pro-
tect against an erroneous deprivation of grantee liberty or property, the
grantee should be afforded an evidentiary hearing before adverse gran-
tor actions such as termination or denial of refunding are taken. Many.
of the distinctions drawn by the Court in distinguishing Goldberg from
Mathews will serve equally well to distinguish grant disputes from the
latter case. In assessing the three factors that constitute the test for re-
quired procedures developed in Mathews in light of the interests that
clash in the typical grant dispute, a conclusion similar to that reached
in Goldberg is warranted.
The first factor under Mathews is the degree of potential deprivation.
In Goldberg, the Court was struck by the "brutal need" of the plaintiffs,
266. Id. at 335.
267. Id. at 340-42.
268. Id. at 348 (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940)).
269. Id. at 348.
270. Id. at 349. These factors are: the importance of the private interest to be affected by the
official action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation through the procedures used as against the
piobable value, if any, of additional or alternative procedural safeguards; and the governmental
interest involved including the additional costs and burdens of requiring new procedures. See
note 266 supra and accompanying text.
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welfare recipients, whose situation upon a termination "becomes im-
mediately desperate."'2 7' Of course, it is obvious that the dilemma fac-
ing indigents whose welfare benefits have been terminated is of a
different character than the crisis faced by amorphous "grantee per-
sons" upon the loss of grant benefits. However, because the federal
grant relationship and the attendant funding may be the very flesh and
blood of the grantee, termination of federal support can have the sever-
est possible consequences.2 72 Grantees who lose federal benefits may
not face the Hobson's choice of indigents who can afford food or rent
but not both. Nevertheless, a grantee may not have the other sources of
support to which the recipient of disability benefits may have access. In
this respect, the grantee may be living closer to the Goldberg margin
than the plaintiff in Mathews v. Eldridge. The plaintiff in Mathews, the
Court found, likely would be able to fall back on "other forms of gov-
ernment assistance [which] will become available" after the termina-
tion of disability benefits.273 It is not likely that a grantee, whose future
opportunities have been harmed by adverse grantor action predicated
on a nonreviewable finding of grantee misconduct, will have such a
safety net.
The second prong of the "what process is due" analysis involves bal-
ancing the fairness and reliability of existing procedures against the
probable worth of alternative procedures. Here again, it appears that
grant disputes are the appropriate subjects of Goldberg-type hearings.
In seeking to determine the exact quantum of procedural rights con-
ferred on grantees, "[plerfect consistency is, of course, not to be
found."274 As a general principle, however, federal grantors "have tra-
ditionally assumed the power to terminate a grant without a prior hear-
ing if the award was discretionary and if the agency was in possession
of evidence indicating noncompliance."275 Yet such a prior hearing
was held to be an absolute necessity in Goldberg. The proposed termi-
271. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 254, 261, 264.
272. Injuries to federal grantees resulting from deprivations of government-conferred liberty
and property interests include: inability to perform the grantees contracts; to retain personnel; to
withstand the stigma resulting from summary findings of misconduct; to capitalize on future grant
opportunities; to fulfill the grantee "mission" in the community; and even to remain in business as
a functioning entity.
273. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 342 (1976).
274. R. CAPPALLI, supra note 7, at 249.
275. Id. at 272. Notwithstanding this generalization that grantees are not afforded customary
due process rights, numerous federal grant programs do allow for procedural protections before
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nation of welfare benefits in that case is analogous to the federal gran-
tor's proposed termination of grant assistance because both
terminations often rest on "incorrect or misleading factual premises or
on misapplication of rules or policies to the facts of particular cases. 276
This contrasts sharply with the disability payment termination at issue
in Mathews v. Eldridge, which depended simply on the presence or ab-
sence of a medically determinable health impairment that would make
gainful employment impossible. This involves a "more sharply focused
and easily documented decision"27 7 than one pertaining to a grant dis-
pute arising out of a confusing and often hotly contested fact
situation.278
The same considerations suggest why the process afforded to grant-
adverse actions are taken against grantees. These safeguards are sometimes part of a statutory
scheme, more often part of a regulatory scheme.
One area notable for authorizing due process protections to grantees by statute is the field of
anti-poverty legislation. Id. See, e.g., Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967, § 604, 42
U.S.C. § 2944 (1976 & Supp. III 1979):
(3) financial assistance under. . . subchapter II of this chapter [relating to financial
assistance to community action programs and related activities] shall not be terminated
for failure to comply with applicable terms and conditions unless the recipient agency
has been afforded reasonable notice and opportunity for a full and fair hearing.
See also 42 U.S.C. § 2991h (1976) (relating to financial assistance to Native American Projects)
and 42 U.S.C. § 2996j (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (relating to financial assistance for providing legal
assistance for indigents).
As for regulatory schemes, the most important is the one promulgated by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (now Health and Human Services) in 1975 providing for a De-
partment Grant Appeals Board. 45 C.F.R. §§ 16.1-.91 (1980). These regulations are important
because they establish "a procedure for a full adjudicative hearing" and because they apply to a
wide variety of grant programs. R. CAPPALLI, supra note 7, at 28 1. For a comprehensive listing of
programs to which these regulations apply, see 46 Fed. Reg. 43,821-22 (1981) (to be codified in 45
C.F.R. § 16, app. A). See also note 16 supra and accompanying text. But see the OMB regulation
quoted in note 164 supra, which does not require a due process hearing before grant suspension or
termination.
Two significant limitations on the protections afforded grantees by statutes or regulations man-
dating grant dispute procedures should be noted. First, these protections will more often be pro-
vided for recipients of mandatory formula grants (eg., states) than for the private recipients of
discretionary grants with whom this Article is principally concerned. Second, it is obvious that if
Congress and administrative agencies see fit to advance procedural rights to grantees, they may
just as easily see fit not to advance such rights until and unless they are put on a constitutional
basis.
276. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970).
277. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976).
278. Obvious instances of noncompliance with grant conditions are usually avoided. There-
fore, "[mlost of the alleged illegalities will stem from unclear federal policies or a confusing back-
ground of facts. In more cases than not, noncompliance allegations are likely to be highly
debatable." R. CAPPALLI, supra note 7, at 217.
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ees should require oral presentations rather than written submissions.
The latter were held adequate in Mathews for the purpose of ascertain-
ing medical facts based on a physician's findings. Grant disputes, how-
ever, because they involve Goldberg-type situations in which
"credibility and veracity are at issue," cannot be satisfactorily resolved
on written submissions. They "do not afford the flexibility of oral
presentations; they do not permit the recipient to mold his argument to
the issues the decision maker appears to regard as important. 279
Grantees should also be afforded a procedural protection closely as-
sociated with oral presentation; that is, the opportunity to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses. "In almost every setting where im-
portant decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires" such
an opportunity.28° Any time serious deprivations are threatened and
their reasonableness depends on findings of fact, the safeguards of con-
frontation and cross-examination have been required-"not only in
criminal cases,. . but also in all types of cases where administrative
...actions were under scrutiny."28'
The procedural safeguards whereby a grantee accused of misconduct
would, before adverse action is taken, be afforded an evidentiary hear-
ing at which an oral presentation could be made and adverse witnesses
confronted and cross-examined would likely reduce substantially the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of constitutionally protected liberty
and property interests. 282 Certainly the risk would be less than that
arising from grant dispute decisions that may be decided, absent statu-
tory or regulatory prohibition, ex parte, unilaterally, and arbitrarily.
The final factor under Mathews is the government's interest in the con-
troversy. This includes the "administrative burden and other societal
costs," fiscal or otherwise, that the alternative or substitute procedures
would entail.28 3 In assessing this factor, it is acknowledged that
"[f]inancial cost alone is not a controlling weight in determining
279. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 270 (quoting Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 497 (1959)).
282. Several other procedural protections required by Goldberg were discussed by the Court in
only a cursory way. They include: timely and adequate notice of the proposed adverse action and
the reasons for it; a statement of reasons for the ultimate decision that is based on the law and
evidence adduced at the hearing; an impartial decision maker, and the right to be represented by
retained counsel. 397 U.S. at 271. It is assumed that any situation found to require that a
Goldberg-type hearing be afforded would also require these specific safeguards.
283. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976).
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whether due process requires a particular procedural safeguard prior to
some administrative decision. '2 4 Nevertheless, the Mathews Court
was concerned that the benefits of additional procedural protections,
such as an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of disability
payments, might be outweighed by administrative costs. 2 5 References
by the Court to the increases in expenditures that would be necessitated
by requiring a greater number of due process hearings and in continu-
ing disability payments pending a final decision suggest that "financial
cost alone" significantly influenced the ultimate decision of the case.
Higher costs would also result if grantee hearing rights were up-
graded and improved. The Mathews situation, however, is distinguish-
able. In Goldberg, "governmental interests in conserving fiscal and
administrative resources" were also asserted to be an adequate basis for
denying hearing rights.28 6 Yet these interests were held to be "not
overriding" in the context of the case. Although the Court recognized
that affording pretermination hearings to welfare recipients "doubtless
involves some greater expense," it found that "the State is not without
weapons to minimize these increased costs. ' 287 The same weapons are
available to the federal grantors. Indeed, the existence of hearing pro-
cedures for many grant programs mandated either by statute or by
regulation belies the argument that procedural safeguards in this con-
text are necessarily so fiscally and administratively burdensome as to
be impractical.
Moreover, an asserted interest in conserving fiscal and administrative
resources is not the only governmental or public interest that should be
scrutinized. The opinion in Goldberg cited public interests in making
correct eligibility determinations and in avoiding erroneous termina-
tions of welfare assistance as factors weighing in favor of providing
increased due process protections. 28 8 These same factors should also be
considered as factors favoring Goldberg-type hearings in grant disputes.
As indicated, federal agencies administering grant programs are im-
plementing an express congressional decision that public funds should
be advanced to a private entity in order to achieve a public purpose.289
284. Id. at 348.
285. Id.
286. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).
287. Id. at 266.
288. Id.
289. See notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
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Adverse action taken against the grantee, such as termination, "guaran-
tees frustration of statutory purpose."290 If a grant is terminated and
then re-awarded to a competing grantee, additional costs are incurred
when the former closes down and the latter starts up. A limited supply
of funds, personnel, and time may be jeopardized just as seriously by
abrupt, unilateral grantor actions as by affording Goldberg-type hear-
ings in cases of grant disputes, especially when these disputes arise
from complex or confusing fact situations or involve interpretation of
ambiguous grant conditions.
A good example of a grant dispute in which an application of the
Mathews test would lead to the conclusion that due process requires a
Goldberg-type hearing is the controversy in Southern Mutual Help As-
sociation v. Califano,291 which was discussed earlier. The charges of
misconduct, noncompliance, and conflict of interest in that case 292
threatened not only to prevent SMHA from retaining its grant, but also
to damage SMHA's reputation and perhaps thereby foreclose its oppor-
tunity to be awarded future grants.2 93 In addition to the important in-
terests SMHA could assert in favor of its argument for a
pretermination hearing, it could also be argued that the fairness and
reliability of a due process hearing was necessary in order to avoid the
risk that the unilateral decision arrived at by HEW worked an errone-
ous deprivation of liberty and/or property interests. At the same time,
no significant governmental interest in a need to conserve fiscal and
administrative resources could be asserted as reasons for denying
SMHA a hearing. As the disposition of the case makes clear, a hearing
mechanism was available,2 94 and transfer of the grant from SMHA to
another grantee involved its own separate costs.
The Southern Mutual case qualifies for a prior evidentiary hearing
on all three prongs of the Mathews test. Of course, the test is a constitu-
tional one, and the decision in Southern Mutual was based on non-
constitutional grounds. Another factor in the case, however, unrelated
to uniquely constitutional purposes, makes Southern Mutual a proper
290. R. CAPPALLI, supra note 7, at 94. Professor Cappalli notes that fiscal sanctions against
grantees can be "paradoxically self-defeating" and that therefore grantors will generally attempt
to secure compliance with grant conditions through voluntary efforts, resorting to coercive meas-
ures only when these efforts fail. Id. at 93-95.
291. 574 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See generally notes 127-51 supra and accompanying text.
292. 574 F.2d at 520-21.
293. Id. at 524.
294. Id. at 528.
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subject for a Goldberg-type hearing. That factor is the existence of the
disputed factual issues that underlie the termination of funding for
SMHA.
One scholar has suggested that there are two principal kinds of hear-
ings: argument and trial-type hearings. 95 The latter kind of hearing
was the kind required by the Court in Goldberg v. Kely.29 6 There, a
trial-type hearing was appropriate because material issues of fact were
in dispute: there was a question as to whether the plaintiff welfare re-
cipients in that case were ineligible to receive AFDC. Similarly, issues
of fact were at the heart of the Southern Mutual controversy: the issues
were whether SMHA was guilty of a conflict of interest and whether
SMHA failed to provide for participation by its target population,
among other charges.
The disputed issues of fact in Goldberg and Southern Mutual con-
cerned adjudicative facts. These are "facts about the parties and their
activities, businesses and properties. . . roughly the kind of facts that
go to a jury in a jury case." '2 97 Such facts generally should not be de-
cided without allowing the parties involved an opportunity to see and
hear the evidence against them and to rebut, refute, or explain that part
of the evidence that is unfavorable to them. Allowing such an opportu-
nity makes sense because the parties involved are in a unique position
to know and understand the facts relating to themselves and their activ-
ities and to provide relevant information about them.298
In addition to adjudicative facts, there are also legislative facts.
These "do not usually concern the immediate parties," involving in-
stead more general information, which can help the decision maker de-
cide general questions of law and policy.299 When legislative facts are
in controversy, they need not be developed by means of a trial-type
hearing. Rather, it is sufficient that the hearing take the form of an
295. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 157 (3d ed. 1972).
296. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
297. K. DAVIS, .rupra note 295, at 160.
298. Id.
299. Id. Professor Davis gives an illustration of the distinction between adjucative and legisla-
tive facts. If the question of whether a potential draftee should be admitted into the army depends
on allegations concerning his past behavior then adjucative facts are at issue. If, however, he has
20-350 vision and the question is whether the minimum requirement should be 20-300 or 20-400,
then legislative facts concerning general information about the needs of the army are at issue. Id.
at 160-61.
Number 4] 1125
Washington University Open Scholarship
1126 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
argument---"a presentation of ideas as distinguished from evidence. ' '30°
If, on the other hand, adjudicative facts are in controversy, a trial-
type hearing of the kind ordered in Goldberg is properly required. The
virtue of a trial-type hearing in determining adjudicative facts is that it
allows for the support, explanation, or rebuttal of disputed facts and for
the direct and cross-examination of witnesses by parties who will likely
have access to relevant information. Most grant disputes will, like
Southern Mutual, involve controversies over adjudicative facts. Conse-
quently, trial-type hearings are appropriate fora in which to resolve
such disputes. When, however, a grant controversy involves a dispute
over legislative facts, the need for the type of evidentiary hearing ar-
gued for here may be substantially less.
In arguing that disappointed federal grantees should be afforded the
type of hearing ordered in Goldberg v. Kelly, there is no intent to imply
that the exact procedural content of such a hearing has been solidly
fixed by the enumeration in Goldberg of certain specific safeguards and
the omission of others.30 ' It may be misleading to consider the specific
elements of a due process hearing in isolation from one another. Thus,
"[i]f an agency chooses to go further than is constitutionally demanded
with respect to one item, this may afford good reason for diminishing
or even eliminating another."302 For example, the Goldberg Court held
that an impartial decision maker was essential,30 3 and Judge Friendly
suggests that there is less need for procedural safeguards and formali-
ties when the decision maker is more removed from the interested ad-
ministrative agency.s° Similarly, it is fundamental to due process that
there be timely notice of proposed adverse governmental actions and of
the grounds for such proposed actions. Notice in the Goldberg case was
not found to be constitutionally deficient. When an agency provides
300. Id. at 157. Typically, a hearing before an appellate court will be of the argument, not
trial, type.
301. The principal procedural safeguards mandated in Goldberg that the hearing be afforded
prior to adverse governmental action, that an opportunity for an oral presentation be afforded,
and that there be an opportunity to confront and cross examine adverse witnesses doubtless must
be carried over to the grant field if Goldberg-type hearings are found to be constitutionally man-
dated in this context. Certain safeguards omitted in Goldberg-for example, formal findings of
fact and conclusions of law, and a record of proceedings-may be necessary or appropriate in a
given grant dispute. Regarding the importance of a record, see notes 351-56 infra and accompa-
nying text.
302. Friendly, supra note 251, at 1279.
303. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
304. Friendly, supra note 251, at 1279.
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more than the minimum notice required by the constitution, a forceful
argument for relaxing other procedural requirements can be made.3"5
The grant appeal procedures devised by the Department of Health
and Human Services (formerly Health, Education, and Welfare) pro-
vide an excellent model of a constitutionally sound due process review
mechanism. As originally promulgated in 1975, the regulations estab-
lished a Departmental Grant Appeals Board that was responsible for
reviewing post-award disputes involving federal grantees. Addition-
ally, the regulations provided explicit procedural requirements to be
followed in the grant dispute adjudication process.306 These regula-
tions gave the Board jurisdiction to adjudicate a variety of grant dis-
putes, including those arising over termination of a grant. In Southern
Mutual Help Association v. Califano, the court held that these regula-
tions provided a hearing right for the plaintiff grantee.30 7
Consistent with the Reagan Administration's desire to simplify gov-
ernment, the Grant Appeals Board regulations recently have been re-
vised into a new, highly streamlined set of procedures.3 0 8 Although the
impact of these new regulations is yet unknown, the regulations appear
to afford the grantee most of the same fundamental due process guar-
antees provided by the 1975 regulations. A party wishing to appeal an
adverse grant decision must within thirty days thereafter submit a writ-
ten notice of appeal to the Board. 309 The respondent then has thirty
days in which to submit documents that support its position, to which
the appellant may reply.310 Following receipt of the parties' written
appeal files, the Board chooses the form of review that will take place:
305. See generally id. at 1281. One of the procedural requirements that Judge Friendly dis-
cusses is the need for an oral presentation. Goldberg ordered that the plaintiff welfare recipients in
that case be afforded an opportunity to present arguments orally. 397 U.S. at 268-69. Judge
Friendly, although he has "no quarrel" with that aspect of the Goldberg decision, "would object to
requiring oral presentation as a universal rule." Friendly, supra note 251, at 1281. Professor
Davis, on the other hand, defines the word "hearing" itself as "any oral proceeding before a
tribunal." K. DAvis, supra note 295, at 157. Judge Friendly notes this definition, but sees "no
reason why in some circumstances a 'hearing' may not be had on written materials only."
Friendly, supra note 251, at 1270. The conclusion here is that for most grant disputes in which
adjudicatory facts are in controversy a due process hearing must afford the grantee an opportunity
to make an oral presentation.
306. 45 C.F.R. §§ 16.1-.91 (1980). These regulations have been superseded by the 1981 regu-
lations discussed at text accompanying notes 308-16 infra.
307. 574 F.2d 518, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also notes 127-51 supra and accompanying text.
308. 46 Fed. Reg. 43,817-22 (1981) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. §§ 16.1-.23).
309. Id. at 43,818 (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 16.7).
310. Id. (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 16.8).
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determination on the written record alone; "informal conference,"
which may involve a telephone conference call between the parties and
a Board member; mediation, which is a new feature of the 1981 regula-
tions; or, when required, a formal hearing.3 1
Because of the time and expense involved in formal hearings, the
regulations require that the Board use special "expedited procedures,"
which replace hearings with less formal mechanisms for disputes in-
volving less than $25,000.3 12 Although the minimum dollar amount
seems to discriminate against recipients of smaller grants, the regula-
tions, which authorize the Board to hold a hearing "[i]f there are
unique or unusually complex issues involved, or other exceptional cir-
cumstances, ' 31 3 at least provide the capacity to alleviate concerns as to
possible unfairness. How frequently the Board will use this escape
clause to provide hearings in cases involving smaller claims remains to
be seen.
If the Board ultimately approves an appellant's request for a hearing,
or if a hearing is required by law, the Board holds a prehearing confer-
ence, which is intended to explore the possibility of a settlement, sim-
plify and clarify issues, draw stipulations and admissions from the
parties, and place limitations on the evidence to be presented.314 The
Board then conducts the hearing in as informal a manner as is reason-
ably possible, "keeping in mind the need to establish an orderly rec-
ord. 315 Although there is no explicit requirement that the Board make
findings of fact and conclusions of law following the hearing, this re-
quirement seems implicit within the regulations that outline the hear-
ing procedures.316
311. Id. (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 16.4).
312. Id. at 43,819-20 (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 16.12).
313. Id. at 43,820 (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 16.12(b)).
314. Id. at 43,819 (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 16.11(b)).
315. Id. (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 16.11(c)).
316. Id. (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 16.11(e)). Goldberg v. Kelly, 497 U.S. 254 (1970),
mentions the need for a statement of reasons that "need not amount to ... even formal findings
of fact and conclusions of law." Id. at 271. No reference is made, however, to a need for a record.
Judge Friendly discusses the record and statement of reasons together "since they are closely
associated with judicial review." Friendly, supra note 251, at 1291. As between the two, he clearly
believes the latter is more important than the former. Absent administrative or judicial review,
Judge Friendly sees "no need for any 'record' in the typical mass justice case." Id. Non-Ameri-
can jurisdictions, he notes, place far less importance on the need for a record of proceedings. A
written statement of reasons, on the other hand, is deemed to be "almost essential" for judicial
review and also "desirable on many other grounds." Id. at 1292. The need to justify an adminis-
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The Departmental Grant Appeals Process procedures outlined here
represent a demonstrably feasible method of affording due process to
federal grantees. Other procedures modeled on them very likely would
be sufficiently similar to the procedural requirements mandated by
Goldberg as to pass constitutional muster. Conversely, a procedure
that omitted a substantial number of the safeguards required by this
regulatory scheme could arguably be open to a successful constitutional
challenge. Federal grantors therefore may wish to follow the example
of the Department of Health and Human Services in order to meet
their obligation to afford grantees their due process rights.
VI. PROTECTIONS PROVIDED GRANTEES BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
The thesis of this Article is that a federal grantee has a due process
right to a fair hearing prior to adverse grantor action. Yet if it were
determined that there is no such constitutional right, the determination
alone would not completely dispose of the grantee's claim to a prior
hearing. Procedural fairness should be the norm under our system, not
an exception that occurs when a clever party manages to slip through a
loophole before a vigilant government agency can shut it off. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has expressed a "concern that traditional forms of
fair procedure not be restricted by implication or without the most ex-
plicit action by the Nation's lawmakers, even in areas where it is possi-
ble that the Constitution presents no inhibition."3 17 Therefore, apart
from any hearing rights conferred by the fifth amendment or by a regu-
latory scheme of a grantor agency, it is contended here that a grantee's
right to a hearing is implicit in statutory principles.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)318 implicitly provides a
statutory hearing right that requires a grantor agency acting adversely
toward a grantee to employ methods comporting with fundamental
principles of fairness. First enacted in 1946,319 the APA had its genesis
in the administration of Franklin Roosevelt, a time of "growth and in-
tensification of administrative regulation of private enterprise and
trative decision "is a powerful preventive of wrong decisions." Id. Moreover, requiring a state-
ment of reasons "is not burdensome." Id.
317. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508 (1959).
318. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976).
319. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980)).
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other phases of Amierican life."'3 20 There was concern that administra-
tive agencies, perceived as a relatively new feature of the national gov-
emnment, combining quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions with
purely administrative ones, might, if uncontrolled, adversely affect pri-
vate rights. Accordingly, Congress enacted the APA as "an outline of
minimum essential rights and procedures. . . afford[ing] private par-
ties a means of knowing what their rights are and how they may protect
them, while administrators are given a simple framework upon which
to base such operations as are subject to the provisions of the [Act]. ' 32 t
The APA has provisions pertaining to the publication of public in-
formation by administrative agencies, to the proper scope of agency
records and access to them, to open meetings, to rulemaking, and to
adjudications. Provisions that are most directly relevant to a grantee
seeking a pretermination hearing, however, are those pertaining to ju-
dicial review. 322
The Act confers a right to judicial review on a person suffering legal
wrong as a result of agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute.323 "Agency action" is defined as including "the whole or a part
of an agency rule, order license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or
denial thereof, or failure to act."'324 A grantor agency's refusal to re-
fund a grant or decision to terminate it would clearly count as agency
320. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1946] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1195.
321. Id. at 1205.
322. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
323. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
Right of review.
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or ag-
grieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other [than]
money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof
acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color or legal authority shall not be
dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States
or that the United States is an indispensable party. The United States may be named as
a defendant in any such action, and a judgment or decree may be entered against the
United States: Provided, That any mandatory or injunctive decree shall specify the Fed-
eral officer or officers (by name or by title), and their successors in office, personally
responsible for compliance. Nothing herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial re-
view or the power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other
appropriate legal or equitable ground, or (2) confers authority to grant relief if any other
statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is
sought.
Id. This language reflects amendments made in the Administrative Procedure Act Amendments
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721.
324. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1976). Terms within this definition are also defined in 5 U.S.C. § 551
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action because it would constitute either an agency sanction or order or
the denial of relief. A grantee who thereby suffered a legal wrong or
was adversely affected or aggrieved by such an action would be entitled
to seek judicial review. The APA provisions allowing for judicial re-
view were recently amended so as to remove the defense of sovereign
immunity as a bar to review.325 Expressions of the legislative intent
behind this amendment serve to illuminate the purposes and policies
furthered by affording judicial review. It was not thought that elimi-
nating the defense of sovereign immunity would create "undue inter-
ference with administration action," but rather that it would be "a
safety-valve to ensure greater fairness and accountability in the admin-
istrative machinery of Government. ' 326 The congressional concern ex-
pressed was that
[a]s Government programs grow, and agency activities continue to per-
vade every aspect of life, judicial review of the administrative actions of
Government officials becomes more and more important. Only if citizens
are provided with access to judicial remedies against Government officials
and agencies will we realize a government truly under law.327
The principal reason for having "limited judicial review of adminis-
trative action is to insure that the decision makers have (1) reached a
reasoned and not unreasonable decision, (2) by employing the proper
criteria, and (3) without overlooking anything of substantial rele-
vance." 328 Anything less "would abandon the interests affected to the
absolute power of administrative officials. '3 29 Thus, when federal ad-
ministrators act adversely to a person's interest, for example, by deny-
ing grant refunding, the possibility of judicial review tends to ensure
that such an action tracks authorized processes and is undertaken in a
procedurally fair manner.330
(1976). "Agency" is defined for purposes of the chapter of the APA relating to judicial review by 5
U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) (1976).
325. Administrative Procedure Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 702, 90 Stat.
2721.
326. H.R. REP. No. 1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6121, 6129,
327. Id. at 6130.
328. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
329. Id.
330. "A reviewing court would be doing less than its duty if it failed to set aside the agency
action [ignoring the purpose of the controlling statute]. By holding an agency accountable to its
lawful duties, the administrative process will be vindicated." International Union of Operating
Eng'rs Local 627 v. Arthurs, 355 F. Supp. 7, 9 (W.D. Okla.) aft'd, 480 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1973).
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Indeed, the value of judicial review is considered so basic that there
is a strong presumption that it is available.33' The APA provides that
agency actions be subject to judicial review, but it does specify two
exceptions to the general rule.332 These exceptions are for statutes pre-
cluding judicial review and for "agency action. . . committed by law
to agency discretion. ' 333 Yet, because of the presumption that judicial
review is available, even the specified exceptions are construed nar-
rowly. Accordingly, judicial review "will not be cut off unless there is a
persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress. 334
"[Jiudicial review of . . . administrative action is the rule, and
nonreviewability an exception which must be demonstrated. 335
No statute creating a grant program specifically precludes a grantee
from judicial review of a denial of grant refunding, and thus no such
statute comes within the exception to judicial review contained in 5
U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). Silence in such a statute, however, on the subject of
judicial review hardly represents the "plainest manifestation" of a con-
gressional intent to preclude review. "Only upon a showing of 'clear
and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the
courts restrict access to judicial review." 336
The second exception in the APA to the remedy of judicial review
provided by that Act does, however, pose a problem within the grant
context. This exception, found in 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), pertains to
agency action committed to agency discretion. It will be remembered
that the grants which are the principal focus of this Article are project
331. "There is no presumption against judicial review and in favor of administrative absolu-
tism unless that purpose is fairly discernable in the statutory scheme." Association of Data
Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970) (citation omitted). "The
mere failure to provide specifically by statute for judicial review is certainly no evidence of intent
to withhold review." H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946), quoted in Camp, 397
U.S. at 157.
332. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976).
333. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
334. Id. In Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964), a case in which the plaintiffs'
debarment from participation in contracting with the Department of Agriculture was challenged
on due process grounds, the defendant-appellant argued that the challenged agency action was not
subject to judicial review because it was within the exceptions to the right of review specified in
the APA. Rejecting this argument the D.C. Circuit held, per Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger,
who was then serving on the circuit court bench, that agency action challenged as a denial of due
process "could be immune from judicial review, if ever, only by the plainest manifestation of
congressional intent to that effect." Id. at 575.
335. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1969).
336. Id.
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grants and that these are often referred to as discretionary grants.337 In
administering discretionary or project grants it is customary that the
grantor agency exercise a wide range of discretion as to many aspects of
the program, including decisions on refunding and termination. Chal-
lenges of grantor actions have been held exempt from the judicial re-
view and other requirements of the APA.33s This grant exemption
from the judicial review requirements of the APA may be quite
broad.339 There is, however, considerable authority for construing the
exception for action committed to agency discretion quite narrowly.340
Moreover, the presumption of judicial review is strongest, and, there-
fore, the discretionary exception is narrowest, when agency action is
"challenge[d] as a denial of due process."34' Similarly, even when an
agency's discretion "may be broad," it will be, if taken in the domestic
337. See note 12 supra.
338. In St. Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., 537 F.2d 283, 284 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 977 (1976), it was held that agency discretion in determining reasonable charges under Medi-
care was sufficient to preclude judicial review. In Kendler v. Wirtz, 388 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1968),
the court declined to review an arrangement approved by the Secretary of Labor in connection
with federal grants-in-aid to state agencies on the allegation of certain railway employees that
their interests had not been adequately protected in the arrangement.
339. In this regard, however, note that 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1976) specifically and expressly
exempts "a matter relating to . . .grants" from APA procedures for rulemaking, but that no
similar provision specifically and expressly exempts agency actions pertaining to grants from judi-
cial review.
340. A nonstatutory review of an HEW order suspending Medicare payments to a provider of
health services for the purpose of recouping allegedly erroneous payments is available under 5
U.S.C. § 703 (1976). Silence of Medicare amendments on the availability of review for determina-
tion other than those specified in 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(c) (1976) is not a manifestation of congres-
sional intent to preclude review of such controversies. Mount Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Weinberger, 376
F. Supp. 1099 (S.D. Fla.), rev'don other grounds, 517 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1975).
No federal court may entertain a pre-enforcement declaratory judgment action against a federal
agency to which 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976) apply if Congress intended to prohibit such judicial
review, but judicial review of final agency action affecting an aggrieved person will not be cut off
unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress. Standard Oil
Co. v. Federal Energy Administration, 440 F. Supp. 328 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
It was the intent of Congress that the provisions of the. . .[APA] were to have wide
application to actions of the federal agencies and that reviewability of agency actions
was to be the rule not the exception. . . . 'To preclude judicial review. . . if not specific
in withholding such review, [the statute] must upon its face give clear and convincing
evidence of intent to withhold it.
Paramount Farms, Inc. v. Morton, 384 F. Supp. 1294, 1296 (W.D. Wis. 1974) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946), a'd, 527 F.2d 1301 (7th Cir. 1975). Prohibition against
judicial review extends to agency action that is committed to agency discretion by law. Hospital
Ass'n of New York State, Inc. v. Tora, 438 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
341. Aquavilla v. Richardson, 437 F.2d 397,402 (2d Cir. 1971), quotedin Caulfield v. Board of
Educ., 449 F. Supp. 1203, 1224 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
Washington University Open Scholarship
1134 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
rather than foreign affair or national security spheres, "subject to judi-
cial review for arbitrariness and abuse of discretion." 342 This possibil-
ity of limited review may be especially important for grantees
challenging adverse actions described as "discretionary" and taken
without any procedural safeguards.3 43
Of course, all agency action requires the exercise of discretion,
whether it involves the grant process or not. It therefore should be self-
evident that Congress did not intend to make all agency actions unre-
viewable. The presence of even broad discretion is not dispositive of
reviewability.34 Delegated power may not be exercised arbitrarily,
and abuse of discretion is necessarily excluded from the compass of a
grant of discretion. Discretion means sound discretion not exercised
arbitrarily. The general rule has been and remains that although courts
will not interfere with the sound exercise of discretion, they will review
administrative action to ascertain whether it has a rational basis and is
reasonable or whether it is arbitrary.345
Certainly, grantees may argue that notwithstanding the need for
grantor discretion in administering grant programs, such discretion
must be exercised in a fair and reasonable manner. As indicated, the
specific exemption of grants from APA rulemaking procedures in 5
U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) makes it difficult to infer an implied exemption of
grants from APA provisions respecting judicial review.346 Moreover,
even when the scope of available review has been truncated by legisla-
tive action vesting a wide range of discretion in an administrative
agency, the APA review provisions still require that agency actions be
held "unlawful" and "set aside" when, for example, an abuse of discre-
tion is found. Consequently, the courts have displayed a willingness to
review agency action at least for the limited purpose of discovering
342. Peoples v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
343. Regarding the discretionary exception to the judicial review provisions of the APA, see,
e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
344. Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706, 711 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 904 (1965). The
circuit court opinion notes the "analytical problem" that inheres in the distinction between action
committed to agency discretion and such action that merely "involves" the exercise of discretion.
336 F.2d at 711.
345. Krueger v. Morton, 539 F.2d 235, 238-39 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Peoples v. United States Dep't
of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
346. See notes 331-43 supra.
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agency abuses or arbitrariness.347
What does the fact that a grantee may be able to establish a right to
some quantum ofjudicial review of an agency decision not to refund or
to terminate its grant have to do with establishing the grantee's right to
a pretermination agency hearing? Through judicial review, a grantee
may demonstrate that he wrongfully was denied his grant, but, in the
meantime, the grant was awarded to someone else. Although the
grantee may be able to establish that he should have continued to re-
ceive the grant, he cannot expect to receive monies already ex-
pended.348  Furthermore, the time and expense may be too prohibitive
for the grantee to establish his right to the grant through the judicial
process. There is an important and growing body of law that calls for
public standards to define and control the exercise of agency discre-
tion.349 A hearing involves cost and delay, but so do protracted court
proceedings and appeals to decide whether a hearing is necessary.
The value of a complete adjudicatory hearing for grantees facing ad-
347. [W]hile review is not granted for action "by law committed to agency discretion," as
noted in section 701 (a)(2), review is expressly provided for when there is an abuse of that
discretion ....
*. . [Tihe courts will not invade the domain of this discretion, but neither can the
agency or official be allowed to exceed the legal perimeter thereof.
Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Schaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Review of Medicare appeal board's decision on provider's reimbursement rights is limited to
determining constitutional questions, errors of law, and determining whether findings "are arbi-
trary or capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence." Overlook Nursing Home, Inc. v.
United States, 556 F.2d 500, 502 (Ct. CL 1977).
When plaintiff sought to enjoin the Office of Economic Opportunity from implementing a deci-
sion that plaintiff would no longer be funded as an independent entity, but would instead be
merged with another legal services organization, allegations that agency action was arbitrary and
capricious entitled plaintiff to "some measure ofjudicial review, limited though it may be." Mon-
mouth Legal Serv. Organization v. Carlucci, 330 F. Supp. 985, 992 (D.N.J. 1971).
Grantees seeking review of decision denying application to refund their projects, although not
entitled to plenary review, were entitled to a review of whether the administrative decision maker
acted arbitrarily or capriciously or failed to articulate factors relevant to the agency's decision.
Mil-Ka-Ko Research & Dev. Corp. v. Office of Economic Opportunity, 352 F. Supp. 169, 173
(D.D.C. 1972), af'd, 497 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
348. In Southern Mut. Help Ass'n v. Califano, 574 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the plaintiff's
eventual post-hearing goal and requested remedy was reinstatement of the final two years of its
grant. The circuit court, however, was of the opinion that such a remedy "no longer exist[ed]"
because the fiscal years had past and the successor grantee had provided the health services. Id. at
522-23 n.22.
349. "Courts have increasingly found that applicants have the right to have their grant appli-
cations rationally considered in accordance with law and have applied the standards of 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 to determine whether denials of grants are arbitrary, capricious, or not in accord with law or
procedural requirements." Madden, supra note 12, at 38.
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verse grantor action is that it will sharpen the issues presented to fed-
eral courts exercising their jurisdiction under the APA. Judicial review
implies just that: review. In this day of crowded federal dockets, the
necessity for a reviewing court to launch an exhaustive de novo inquiry
into the often complex and hotly contested fact situations that may un-
derlie an agency's adverse grant decision challenged as arbitrary and
capricious, or as an abuse of discretion, may make truly egregious de-
mands on what are already strained judicial resources. Given even the
limited judicial review of discretionary grantor decisions authorized by
the APA, it is clear that the denial, revocation, termination, and admin-
istration of a grant should be subject to the scrupulous observance of
fair procedures. Actions undertaken for obscure or undisclosed reasons
should not be tolerated. Therefore, in order properly to guard against
an abuse of discretion and to minimize the costs of review, the APA
should be deemed to require a prior hearing for grantees who allege
they are "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action." 350
By requiring some kind of hearing, an agency is forced to make a
record. This, in turn, provides something substantial for a court to re-
view and may altogether obviate the necessity of taking evidence to
resolve disputed issues of historical fact. 5 ' Without the aid of a record,
it is difficult to see how courts satisfactorily can review agency decisions
that are required by the APA.352
Judge Friendly, in his discussion of procedural hearing safeguards,
treats the making of a record together with the need for a statement of
reasons because both "are closely associated with judicial review. ' '3 53
He places an even higher value on the latter than on the former be-
cause a written statement of reasons, in addition to serving other ends,
350. See note 322 supra.
351. The Supreme Court has recognized the difficulty of reviewing administrative action
based on an administrative record not before it. When there are no formal agency findings, "it
may be that the only way there can be effective judicial review is by examining the decisionmakers
themselves." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (requiring a
hearing on the record may make it unnecessary to call federal administrators to court for their
testimony). See also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
352. Judicial review of administrative action in refusing to process and approve applications
under the Housing Act of 1959 for direct, low interest, long term loans to provide housing for the
elderly and whether such loans were terminated for program related reasons, should normally be
based on the full administrative record that was before the decision maker at the time the chal-
lenged action was taken and not on a de novo inquiry into the facts by the district court. Co-
operative Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 562 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
353. Friendly, supra note 251, at 1291.
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is "almost essential if there is to be judicial review. '35 4 A statement of
reasons is often crucial for the very simple reason that the court needs
to know what the agency really has determined and why in order to
understand precisely what must be reviewed. "Reviewing courts would
face an impossible task if agencies reached decisions without making
and recording clear findings."35 By articulating reasons for its actions,
an agency affords the public and itself a safeguard against arbitrariness
and carelessness and helps develop greater consistency in its decision
making.3
56
In En vironmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus,357 the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reviewed an administrative order refusing to sus-
pend federal pesticide registration. The court remanded the cause for
further proceedings on the ground that there was an inadequate expla-
nation of the administrative decision being challenged. Writing for the
court, Chief Judge Bazelon reasoned that it was "necessary, but not
sufficient, to insist on strict judicial scrutiny of administrative ac-
tion. '3 8 There were limitations on the efficacy of that kind of scrutiny:
For judicial review alone can correct only the most egregious abuses. Ju-
dicial review must operate to ensure that the administrative process itself
will confine and control the exercise of discretion. Courts should require
administrative officers to articulate the standards and principles that gov-
ern their discretionary decisions in as much detail as possible. Rules and
regulations should be freely formulated by administrators, and revised
when necessary. Discretionary decisions should more often be supported
with findings of fact and reasoned opinions. When administrators pro-
vide a framework for principled decision-making, the result will be to
diminish the importance of judicial review by enhancing the integrity of
the administrative process, and to improve the quality of judicial review
in those cases where judicial review is sought.359
354. Id. at 1291.
355. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 627 v. Arthurs, 355 F. Supp. 7, 16 (W.D.
Okla.), af'd, 480 F.2d 602 (10th Cir. 1973).
356. Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown, Inc. v. D.C. Zoning Comm'n, 477 F.2d 402,408 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
357. 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
358. Id. at 598.
359. Id. (footnotes omitted). The reasoning of Enyironmental Defense Fund was recently fol-
lowed in Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Va. 1980), in which the
idea that federal administrators articulate the standards governing their exercise of discretion was
described as "a fundamental principle linked with due process." Id. at 854. See also Matlovich v.
Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and the cases cited therein.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The thesis of this Article is that only a prior hearing of the Goldberg-
type, such as provided by the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices Department Grant Appeals Board, can provide grantees with the
kind of record and statement of reasons that are an essential requisite
to the federal courts' ability to discharge adequately their constitutional
obligation of judicial review. A hearing at which a grantee may contro-
vert allegations of misconduct, present evidence in its own behalf, and
question the assumptions underlying agency action will lead to a record
enabling a reviewing court to identify the proper standards for apprais-
ing the action of the grantor agency. Moreover, requiring such a hear-
ing will necessarily promote an atmosphere of fairness and tend to
encourage improved grantor-grantee relations in what are acknowl-
edged to be cooperative enterprises. It may even be that the increased
perception (and reality) of procedural fairness in grant decision making
may so mollify even disappointed grantees that hearing decisions unfa-
vorable to them will not lead to court challenges. Yet, regardless of
whether such hearings can suffice as final adjudications that need not
be reviewed by an overworked judiciary, they would inevitably serve to
advance, throughout the field of federal grant making, the cause of ad-
ministrative fairness and accountability that was made a national pol-
icy by congressional enactment of the APA.
Some may consider the central theme of this Article a somewhat
technical aspect of the subject of procedural due process in the federal
grant context. Although an analysis of procedural safeguards might
appear an extremely technical exercise, history has shown that such
safeguards provide the best protection against the excesses of the arbi-
trary use of power by the government. 60 To the extent that procedural
due process protections succeed in opening the federal grant system to
the light of public inquiry, it will have done so largely by securing
grantees with safeguards necessary to secure fair and reasoned deci-
sions at the hands of federal grantors. This will be particularly critical
as we enter a period of finite and limited government resources.
360. "The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safe-
guards." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
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